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The promotion of Local Economic Development (LED) increasingly involves the allocation of 
grant finance for project implementation.  This finance is often provided on condition that the 
grant recipient commits a certain level of co-funding to the project.  These co-funding 
requirements are essentially a risk-sharing mechanism used to avert the agency problems, 
namely adverse selection and moral hazard, which occur in the relationship between the 
funding programme and the grant beneficiaries.  The purpose of this study is to examine 
whether these requirements are effective at achieving this aim and to determine their impact 
on the LED outcomes of various types of projects.  This is undertaken through the comparative 
analysis of projects funded through the Gijima KwaZulu-Natal Local Competitiveness Fund 
Implementation Programme (LCFI), which provided grant funding for projects implemented by 
the private sector, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and local government.  The 
findings indicate that co-funding has a positive impact on internally co-funded private sector 
projects and in this scenario is necessary to achieve optimal outcomes.  Inversely, co-funding 
has a detrimental impact on projects implemented by non-profit groups in that it requires the 
attraction of funding from additional organisations whose finance conditions may not align to 
those of the principal donor.  Finally, co-funding is ineffective when provided by government 
for the implementation of community projects due to the lack of risk it assumes.  These findings 
have implications for the design of LED grant programmes and support the assertion that grant 
programme should be designed to efficiently reflect the objectives and risk preferences of the 
institutions they support.   
  
 
iii | P a g e  
 
PREFACE 
The work described in this dissertation was carried out in the School of Built Environment and 
Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus, Durban, from 
September 2010 to November 2012, under the supervision of Professor Imraan Valodia. 
 
These studies represent original work by the author and have not otherwise been submitted in 
any form for any degree or diploma to any tertiary institution. Where use has been made of the 











iv | P a g e  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT .........................................................................................................................................ii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Local Development Challenges ................................................................................................ 2 
1.2. The Gijima KZN LCFI Programme ............................................................................................. 2 
1.3. Problem Statement and Research Questions .......................................................................... 3 
1.4. Structure of the Dissertation ................................................................................................... 3 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................... 5 
2.1. What is LED? ............................................................................................................................ 5 
2.1.1. Definitions of LED .......................................................................................................... 6 
2.1.2. Approaches to LED ........................................................................................................ 7 
2.2. International LED Experience ................................................................................................... 8 
2.2.1. LED in the Developed World ......................................................................................... 8 
2.2.2. LED in the Developing World ...................................................................................... 10 
2.3. South Africa: Evolution of LED ............................................................................................... 13 
2.3.1. Early Initiatives ............................................................................................................ 13 
2.3.2. LED in the Transition Years ......................................................................................... 15 
2.4. South Africa: LED Policy Framework ...................................................................................... 15 
2.5. South Africa: LED Stakeholders .............................................................................................. 17 
2.5.1. The Role of Government ............................................................................................. 18 
2.5.2. Private Sector Participation ........................................................................................ 20 
2.5.3. Civil Society Involvement ............................................................................................ 20 
2.6 South Africa: LED Objectives ................................................................................................... 21 
2.6.1. Pro-Growth LED .......................................................................................................... 22 
2.6.2. Pro-Poor LED ............................................................................................................... 23 
2.7. South Africa: LED Interventions ............................................................................................. 25 
2.7.1. Large Urban Centres ................................................................................................... 25 
2.7.2. Secondary Cities and Towns ....................................................................................... 26 
2.7.3. Regions and Corridors ................................................................................................. 27 
2.7.4. Rural Areas and Communities .................................................................................... 28 
2.8. South Africa: Grant Funded Initiatives ................................................................................... 29 
2.8.1. The LED Fund .............................................................................................................. 30 
2.8.2. The EU Funded LED Programme ................................................................................. 31 
 
v | P a g e  
 
2.8.3. The Role of Co-funding ............................................................................................... 33 
2.9. International Norms: Shaping LED in South Africa ................................................................ 34 
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK – AGENCY THEORY ...................................................... 36 
3.1. Origins of Agency Theory ....................................................................................................... 36 
3.2. The Principal-Agent Relationship ........................................................................................... 37 
3.2.1 Adverse Selection ......................................................................................................... 38 
3.2.2 Moral Hazard ............................................................................................................... 39 
3.3. Agency Theory and the Optimal Contract ............................................................................. 40 
3.4 Applications of Agency Theory ............................................................................................... 42 
3.5. Agency Theory Critiques ........................................................................................................ 43 
CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................... 45 
4.1 Grounded Theory Methods .................................................................................................... 45 
4.2 Preliminary Research .............................................................................................................. 46 
4.3 Primary Research .................................................................................................................... 47 
4.4. Data Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 48 
4.5 Strength’s and Limitations ...................................................................................................... 50 
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH FINDINGS ................................................................................................. 52 
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................... 55 
6.1. Employment Creation and Poverty Alleviation ..................................................................... 55 
6.2. Closing the Gap between the First and Second Economy ..................................................... 57 
6.3. Development of Economic Infrastructure ............................................................................. 58 
6.4. Skills Development that Meets Local Economic Demand ..................................................... 59 
6.5. Achieving the Principles of Black Economic Empowerment ................................................. 62 
6.6. Impact on the Local Economy ................................................................................................ 64 
6.7. Extent of Private Sector Support and Financing .................................................................... 66 
6.8. Economic and Financial Sustainability of Project Benefits .................................................... 67 
Chapter 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................. 71 
7.1. Impact of Co-funding on Project Outcomes and Sustainability............................................. 71 
7.1.1. Internally Co-Funded Projects .................................................................................... 71 
7.1.2. Externally Co-Funded Projects .................................................................................... 72 
7.1.3. Government Co-Funded Projects ............................................................................... 73 
7.2. Recommendations for LED Programme Design..................................................................... 74 
7.2.1. Agency Theory: Co-Funding as a Risk Sharing Mechanism......................................... 74 
7.2.2. Agency Theory: Optimal Contracts for LED Funding .................................................. 76 
 
vi | P a g e  
 
7.3. Additional Areas of Research ................................................................................................. 77 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................. 79 
INTERVIEWEES CITED .................................................................................................................. 101 
APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................................. 103 
APPENDIX B: ................................................................................................................................ 105 
APPENDIX C: ................................................................................................................................ 107 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 1: Variables influencing the relative efficiency of behaviour-based and outcome-based 
contracts   ...................................................................................................................................... 41 
TABLE 2: The European Commission’s standard evaluation grid  ................................................ 50 
TABLE 3: Analysis of project outcomes ........................................................................................ 53 
TABLE 4: Summary of completed Gijima KZN LCFI projects....................................................... 110 
TABLE 5: List of project interviews  ............................................................................................ 112 
TABLE 6: List of expert interviews  ............................................................................................. 114 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES  
FIGURE 1: Job creation and household income  ........................................................................... 56 





vii | P a g e  
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
There are a number of people I am grateful towards for their help with the completion of this 
dissertation: 
 
My Supervisor Dr. Imraan Valodia for his unwavering guidance during the design, research and 
writing of this study. 
 
The staff at the KZN Department of Economic Development and Tourism for the wealth of 
information and insight they shared.  In particular Mr. Ranveer Persad, Mr. Gerry McDonald, 
and Mr. Mandla Sibeko for their valuable insight.  
 
The numerous project stakeholders who took the time to share their experience with me.  
 
Marita Lervik for her support and accommodation during my visits to Durban.  
 
Finally, my husband Jan Snyman for.. everything.   
  
 
viii | P a g e  
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ASGI-SA - Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative – South Africa 
BBSDP - Black Business Supplier Development Programme 
BEE - Black Economic Empowerment 
B-BBEE - Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment  
BEF - Business Enabling Fund 
CAP - Competitiveness Action Plan 
CBD - Central Business District 
CIS - Co-operative Incentive Scheme 
DBSA - Development Bank of South Africa 
DEDT - Department of Economic Development and Tourism 
DOA - Department of Agriculture 
DPLG - Department of Provincial and Local Government 
DTI - Department of Trade and Industry 
EU - European Union 
GEAR - Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
IDC - Industrial Development Corporation 
IDZ - Industrial Development Zone 
ILO - International Labour Organisation 
KZN - KwaZulu-Natal 
LCFI - Local Competitiveness Fund Implementation 
LED - Local Economic Development 
LEDF - Local Economic Development Fund 
MIP - Manufacturing Investment Programme 
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation 
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
RDA - Regional Development Agency  
RDP - Reconstruction and Development Programme 
RIDS - Regional Industrial Development Strategy 
RSA - Republic of South Africa 
SALGA - South African Local Government Association 
SANCO - South African National Civic Organisation 
SODS - School of Development Studies 
SDI  - Spatial Development Initiative  
SEZ - Special Economic Zone 
SMME - Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise 
TSP - Tourism Support Programme 
UK - United Kingdom 
UKZN - University of KwaZulu-Natal 
US - United States 
ZAMSIF - Zambian Social Investment Fund 
 
1 | P a g e  
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The democratic transition that occurred in South Africa during the early and mid-1990s was 
accompanied by government decentralisation, re-entry into global markets, and the need to 
integrate historically disadvantaged areas into the formal economy (Rogerson, 2000; McQuaid 
and Nel, 2002; Marais, 2010).  This created what Nel and Rogerson (2005a) call a “laboratory 
for experimentation, innovation and learning” in local economic development (LED).  The result 
was a proliferation of LED programmes funded by various sources including international 
donors, development institutions, national departments, and local government (Patterson, 
2008). 
 
The current study focuses specifically on an LED programme implemented by the European 
Union (EU) and the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) Department of Economic Development and Tourism 
(DEDT).  This programme, known as the Gijima KZN Local Competitiveness Fund 
Implementation (LCFI), allocated grant funding to successful applicants for the implementation 
of LED projects (DEDT, 2007).  These grants ranged between R380,000 and R3.8 million and 
were provided on condition that the grant recipient would secure a minimum 30% of the total 
project cost, a requirement known as co-funding (DEDT, 2007).  There was however no 
regulation regarding the source of co-funding, with applicants relying on internal finances, 
external grants, and government funds (UKZN, 2011).  
 
In 2010 an impact evaluation of the LCFI programme was conducted by the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) School of Development Studies (SODS)1.  The objective of the evaluation 
was to determine the programmes design efficiency and LED outcomes2 (UKZN, 2011).  In terms 
of programme design the evaluation revealed uncertainty over the impact of co-funding 
requirements, although certain trends emerged between the source of co-funding and the 
                                                     
1 As a student of the SODS the researcher worked as an assistant on the LCFI Impact Assessment.  
2 For further information on the overall impact of the LCFI Programme see „A socio-economic impact assessment of 
the Local Competitiveness Fund‟s implementation projects under Gijima KZN LED support program‟ conducted by 
the UKZN School of Development Studies (2011). 
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success and sustainability of the project (UKZN, 2011).  The purpose of the current study is to 
examine these trends and determine whether co-funding is an effective mechanism for 
improving LED outcomes in a grant financed programme.  The findings from this evaluation will 
be used to provide recommendations for the design of future LED funds.  
 
1.1. Local Development Challenges  
The development challenges in South Africa are incredibly complex and owe largely to the 
socio-economic and spatial legacy of apartheid.  These challenges include persistently high 
unemployment, poverty, and inequality (Hoogeveen & Ozler, 2005; Van der Berg & Louw, 
2004).  The current study focuses specifically on efforts to address these challenges in KwaZulu-
Natal (KZN), where these challenges are amplified due to high rates of HIV infection and 
household dependency (Welz et al, 2007; DBSA, 2011).  The province also benefits however 
from a skilled professional workforce, functioning private sector, and the capacity of non-state 
actors (J. Mitchell, personal communication, 24 November, 2010).  This combination of 
attributes and constraints places KZN in a unique position to implement new approaches to 
LED.   
 
1.2. The Gijima KZN LCFI Programme 
The Gijima KZN programme was implemented as part of a three province initiative funded by 
the EU and aimed at reducing rural poverty in KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and the Eastern Cape 
(Marais, 2010).  The KZN initiative pursued a phased approach to LED focusing on the creation 
of an enabling environment, development of business plans, and the implementation of specific 
projects (Marais, 2010).  The implementation phase was executed through the LCFI programme 
which funded 27 projects from 2005 to 2011, of which 25 were completed (UKZN, 2011).  In 
2012 the KZN DEDT launched a revised version of the programme known as the LCFI II pursuing 
similar objectives, albeit with a greater focus on partnership and cluster development (DEDT, 
2011).    
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1.3. Problem Statement and Research Questions 
The LCFI programme, in keeping with international trends, required that grant beneficiaries co-
fund the cost of implementing their project.  These co-funding requirements are assumed to be 
an effective screening mechanism, weeding-out non-viable projects, while also allowing 
applicants to signal their commitment to project success.  The purpose of this study is to 
examine these assumptions and whether they are accurate in scenarios involving grant finance. 
This issue is addressed through evaluation of co-funding’s role and impact in the Gijima KZN 
LCFI programme with the intention of answering the following research questions: 
1. What is the relationship between co-funding arrangements and the outcome and 
sustainability of LCFI projects? 
2. Is co-funding an effective mechanism for sharing risk between an LED programme and 
its grant beneficiaries? 
3. What are the optimal arrangements for LED funding given the different objectives, 
capacities and risk preferences of grant applicants? 
 
1.4. Structure of the Dissertation  
The dissertation is arranged according to the following structure.  Chapter one provided an 
introduction to the study including an overview of development issues in South Africa and KZN 
as well as a description of the Gijima KZN LCFI programme.  This is followed in Chapter two by a 
review of the relevant literature on LED.  This review seeks to define LED and the various 
approaches to it; examine the LED experience in both the developed and developing worlds; 
and analyse the evolution and practice of LED in South Africa. 
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical framework for examining grant co-funding arrangements 
based on the principals of agency theory.  This includes a presentation of the theory and the 
problems it seeks to resolve, as well as its applications and critiques.  Chapter 4 presents the 
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research methodology which describes the identification, collection and analysis of relevant 
information according to the grounded theory methods.    
Chapter 5 presents the research findings from the comparative analysis of project outcomes.  
Chapter 6 discusses these findings in order to ascertain the relationship between project 
outcomes and co-funding arrangements.  Chapter 7 then provides conclusions drawn from this 
analysis as well as recommendations for the design of future LED grant funds.  This chapter also 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW   
The literature review seeks to synthesise the relevant research and analysis on LED and its 
funding mechanisms.  This begins with a delineation of LED according to the most widely 
accepted definitions and approaches followed by a summary and comparison of LED in the 
developed and developing worlds.  The literature review then turns to the experience of LED in 
South Africa.  The practice is traced from the decentralised promotion of towns and cities in the 
early 20th century, to the apartheid governments stratified industrial efforts, and finally the 
reliance on LED as a remedy for the socio-economic ills of apartheid.   
 
The analysis of LED in modern South Africa provides an overview of the LED policy framework, 
which oscillates between the economic priorities of two government departments, as well as 
the implementation of this policy by the public, private and civil society sectors.  This 
implementation is also examined in terms of LED’s key objectives, defined as either growth or 
poverty oriented, and their execution in the countries cities, towns, corridors, and rural areas.   
Finally, the review of South Africa’s LED experience looks specifically at the use of grant funding 
to incentivise project implementation and the various achievements and lessons associated 
with this practice.   
 
2.1. What is LED?  
There is no universally accepted definition of LED or just how ‘local’ it is (Simon, 2003), although 
the concept is described by nearly all development organisations as well as top scholars and 
local actors.  The following is a presentation of the most widely accepted of these definitions as 
well as the LED iterations of South Africa’s most involved government departments.  The 
concept of LED is also understood according to its most common approaches which, according 
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2.1.1. Definitions of LED 
The concept of LED is defined by international organisations, development scholars, and 
government departments.  The World Bank (2011) refers to it as a “process by which public, 
business, and nongovernmental sector partners work collectively to create better conditions for 
economic growth and employment generation”.  This definition is expanded on by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) which emphasises the role of partnerships and the 
importance of “exploiting local resources and capacities” (2010).  Finally, United Nations-
Habitat (2009) provides a detailed explanation of LED that encompasses both the World Bank 
and ILO’s definitions as well as specifically mentioning the “creation of decent jobs” and 
inclusion of the “poor and marginalised” (2011).    
 
The term LED is also transcribed by several influential scholars.  Stohr (1990, p.8) defines the 
concept vaguely as a process of “unifying relevant stakeholders to undertake activities that 
improve the areas economic and social condition”.  More specifically, Blakely (1994, p.XVI) 
argues that the goal of LED is to “stimulate local employment opportunities, using existing 
human, natural, and institutional resources". Finally, Zaaijer and Sara (1993, p.129) stress the 
role of partnerships defining LED as “a process in which local governments and/or community 
based groups manage their existing resources and enter into partnership arrangements with 
the private sector, or with each other, to create new jobs and stimulate economic activity in an 
economic area”.  This is perhaps the most often cited definition of LED and the one that most 
accurately aligns to the priorities of Gijima KZN.   
 
In South Africa the role of LED is defined by the Department of Provincial and Local 
Government (DPLG) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) which are responsible for 
LED policy formation.  These agencies collaborated on a broad definition for LED as “an 
approach towards economic development which allows and encourages local people to work 
together to achieve sustainable economic growth and development thereby bringing economic 
benefits and improved quality of life for all residents in a local municipal area” (DPLG, 2005).   
However, despite their collaboration their approaches are “based on conflicting paradigms and 
 
7 | P a g e  
 
 
have been pulling in different directions; one towards a focus on poverty alleviation within poor 
communities, and the other towards engagement with global economic forces through means 
to enhance competitive advantage” (Patterson, 2008, p.4) 
 
The Department of Economic Development and Tourism (DEDT) in KZN, which is responsible for 
the Gijima KZN LCFI programme, defines LED according to national policy while also attempting 
to balance the priorities of the DPLG and DTI (DEDT, 2007).  To this effect the DEDT advocates 
for the implementation of economically sustainable actions, projects and businesses to be 
achieved through competitive practices, financial independence and social and environmental 
responsibility (DEDT, 2007).  The KZN DEDT also specifies that the outcome of these LED 
initiatives should improve the quality of life of poor and marginalised people (R. Persad, 2011, 
pers. comm.).   
 
2.1.2. Approaches to LED  
The lack of a precise definition for LED is consistent with the various approaches to its 
implementation.  These approaches are categorised by Helmsing (2003) as community 
economic development, enterprise development, and locality development.  Community 
economic development involves activities which reduce household poverty and vulnerability by 
encouraging economic diversification (Helmsing, 2003).  Also referred to as self-reliant, 
endogenous or ‘bottom-up’ development (Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992; Binns, 1995), community 
economic development is typically initiated by organisations such as church’s, women’s groups, 
civil society, and NGOs.  This approach is consistent with the priorities of the DPLG although the 
Department advocates that local government facilitate the process (DPLG, 2000). 
 
The second category of LED, enterprise development, includes all initiatives involving SMMEs 
and big business as well as enterprise clusters (Helmsing, 2003).  This type of LED focuses on 
promoting private sector development, local competitiveness, job creation and small business 
growth (Bond, 2002) and is therefore in line with the DTI approach.    The third and final 
 
8 | P a g e  
 
 
category, locality development, involves central and sub-national government in the planning 
and management of an area’s economic and physical expansion (Helmsing, 2003). Locality 
development is important because it creates the necessary foundation for enterprise and 
community LED (Nel & McQuaid, 2002).  This distinction is relevant in South Africa where the 
failure of projects in rural and marginalised areas is often attributed to insufficient investment 
in infrastructure and social capital (Patterson, 2008).  
 
2.2. International LED Experience 
South Africa is often described as having a two-tiered economy, exhibiting characteristics from 
both the developed and developing worlds (Bhorat & Cassim, 2004; Du Toit, 2005).  Thus, the 
experience of LED in advanced and emerging economies can provide lessons for the design of 
South African programmes.  The following is a review of this experience as recorded in the 
literature.   
 
2.2.1. LED in the Developed World 
The concept of LED emerged in policy debates among developed countries during the late 
1960s and early 1970s (Robbins, 2011).  This emphasis on LED was fuelled in part by the 
weakening of central authority as national resources diminished, public confidence declined, 
and power was decentralised (Blakely, 1989; Valler & Wood, 2010; Robbins, 2011).  The LED 
process was also bolstered by increased urbanisation and local diversification, which 
contributed to the rise of cities as international players (Clark & Gaile, 1998).  However, despite 
common roots the implementation of LED in the developed world differed greatly between 
countries.  This review focuses specifically on two countries with a rich LED experience, namely 
the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). 
 
The LED experience of the US is divided by Clarke and Gaile (1998) as occurring into four 
phases, namely locational incentives, transitional entrepreneurial incentives, post federal 
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entrepreneurial incentives, and global-local links and human capital.   In the first phase sub-
national governments used ‘locational incentives’ such as tax breaks, land discounts, and 
production subsidies to attract investment (Clarke & Gaile, 1998).  This approach was criticised 
however for its lack of transparency, prioritisation of large firms, and negative consequences 
for the environment and labour (Squires, 1989; Clark & Gaile 1998).  This criticism led to a shift 
in the late 1980s towards the second phase of LED labelled ‘transitional entrepreneurial 
incentives’ (Clarke & Gaile, 1998).  These incentives focused on creating an enabling business 
environment and removing barriers of entry for small firms (Clark & Gaile, 1998; Eisinger, 1988; 
Blakely & Leigh, 2002).   
 
The second phase of LED in the US was largely successful and resulted in the diversification of 
many local economies (Clark and Gaile, 1998).  Thus, this approach became the core of the 
American LED process and was thereafter tailored to account for emerging priorities (Robbins, 
2011).  This tailoring led to the third phase of LED, which Clark and Gaile (1998) call post federal 
entrepreneurial incentives.  These incentives brought greater focus to competitiveness and the 
development of local partnerships (Clark & Gaile, 1998).  This was followed in the fourth and 
final phase by an emphasis on global connectivity, human capital development, trade 
partnerships and technology transfer (Clark & Gaile, 1998; O’Doherty & Durrschmidt, 1999; 
Reed, 1999). 
 
The approach to LED in the UK, in contrast to the US, was controlled largely by the central 
government and as such was more consistent (Robbins, 2011).  In the UK, although investment 
attraction was considered important, priority was given to skills development and employment 
creation (Townroe, 1979).  These initiatives were carried out through long-term partnerships 
between government and local stakeholders.  In the 1990s these partnerships were further 
strengthened by the creation of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) which were tasked 
with guiding LED and, where necessary, providing specialist support to local groups (Robbins, 
2011).  These agencies also participated in the drafting and implementation of LED strategy, 
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therefore giving a local voice to the process (Bennett, 1991; Hutchinson, 1994; Bennett et al, 
2004).   
 
The impact of LED efforts in the UK, US and elsewhere in the developed world is strongly 
debated.  There are academics who contend that LED has successfully promoted market 
development and resulted in increasingly dynamic and resilient local economies (Hall, 1995; 
Stock, 1995).  This argument is challenged however by those who believe that LED has declined 
or become redundant as a result of consistently poor results (Green et al, 1996; Nel, 2001; 
Cunningham & Meyer-Stamer (2005).  However, regardless of these assessments LED is 
increasingly relied upon to boost urban and regional economies throughout the developed 
world by attracting investment in manufacturing, technology and tourism (Rogerson, 2011). 
 
The relevance of LED in the developed world has more recently been fuelled by efforts to revive 
economies in the wake of the global recession.  This is most clearly demonstrated in the 
Barcelona Principles, which were drafted in 2009 by the leaders of OECD countries (Clark, 
2009).  These principles provide a framework for local authorities and stakeholders in the 
implementation of LED (Clark, 2009).  They reaffirm many existing priorities including 
investment attraction, partnership creation, intergovernmental collaboration, and 
improvements to infrastructure and service delivery (Clark, 2009; Bailey & Chapain, 2011).  
However, they also prescribed newly relevant goals of “retaining productive people, business, 
incomes, jobs, and investment projects” as well as the identification of “future sources of jobs, 
enterprise and innovation” (Clark, 2009; Bailey & Chapain, 2011).   
 
2.2.2. LED in the Developing World 
In the developing world the practice of formal, government directed LED is a relatively recent 
phenomenon.  Prior to the 1990s most LED activities were limited to promoting ‘self-reliance’ 
and ‘community survival’ (Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992; Sihlongonyane, 2003; Binns, 1995).  These 
strategies were, and in many places continue to be, poorly planned, rarely documented and 
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undertaken on an ad-hoc basis (Rogerson, 1997a).  These traditional interventions are 
implemented by community groups using local resources such as indigenous knowledge and 
collective farming with little or no direction or support from government (Rogerson, 1995, 
1997b, 1999b, 2002a;; Binns & Nel, 1999; Nel, 2001; Abrahams, 2003).   
 
The practice of strategically planned or ‘modern’ LED only took root in the developing world in 
the 1990s and early 21st century (Herbst, 1990; Robbins, 2011).   This new approach is viewed in 
the literature as a response to structural adjustment programmes (Herbst, 1990; Helmsing, 
2003), as well as tragedies such as drought, war and civil strife (Sihlongonyane, 2003).  It is also 
attributed to the rise of cities as increasingly independent and capacitated units due to rapid 
urbanisation (Beyer et al, 2003; Cities Alliance, 2007), enhanced administrative capacity (Zaijer 
& Sara, 1993; Beyer et al, 2003; Helmsing, 2005; Rodriguez-Pose & Tijimstra, 2007), and 
government decentralisation (Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992; Crawford and Hartmann, 2008).  This 
urban naissance benefited from the availability of communications technology, which some 
authors argue made the entire LED process possible (Helmsing, 2003; Blair & Carrol, 2008).   
 
The expansion of LED in the developing world has also been fuelled by the support of numerous 
stakeholders. This includes local and international universities and research centres, which are 
involved in LED knowledge creation and training (Porter, 2000; van Boekel & van Logtestijn, 
2002).  The LED process also involves small business owners, especially where they are 
represented by a business association, chamber of commerce or trade union (Rogerson, 2000; 
Helmsing, 2003).  At the local level traditional community groups continue to play an important 
role in stimulating development, especially in highly marginalised areas (Helmsing, 2003).  
Finally, international, national and regional development agencies facilitate LED policy making, 
financing and implementation throughout the developing world (Blakely, 2002; Clark et al, 
2010).    
 
The involvement of numerous stakeholders has also sparked debate over the appropriate 
objectives and design of LED strategies in the developing world.  Typically civil society, 
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community organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) argue for a pro-poor 
approach that emphasises poverty alleviation and community development (Klasen, 2004; 
Kimenyi, 2006).  On the other hand, the private sector, many economists and central 
governments argue that LED should focus should on stimulating economic growth (Dollar & 
Kray, 2002) which will translate into poverty reduction (Ravallion & Chen, 1997; Foster & 
Szekely, 2000).   In a review of these debates Page (2006) argues that both pro-poor and pro-
growth concerns can be addressed in a ‘shared growth strategy’.  From another viewpoint 
Marriot (2004) cautions that LED practitioners should not become pre-occupied with the 
balance between these two objectives.    
 
Despite the range of LED objectives a common goal amongst most programmes, whether pro-
growth or pro-poor, is the creation of meaningful employment (Stren & Gombay, 1994; 
Rogerson, 1999b).  This is especially true in the developing world where the capacity for labour 
is one of the greatest resources (Rogerson, 1999a).  The various LED strategies that have 
prioritised this objective include labour intensive public projects and enterprise development 
funds (Stren & Gombay, 1994; Tendler & Amorim, 1996).  Alternatively local government 
indirectly encourages job creation by promoting an enabling business environment through 
infrastructure investment, improved service delivery, marketing support and training 
assistance.  These interventions allow local governments to facilitate economic growth without 
the market distortions that often accompany subsidies and tax breaks (Stren & Gombay, 1994; 
Bond, 1998; Ecsecc, 1998; Rogerson, 1999a).    
 
The recent proliferation of LED in the developing world has also resulted in various approaches 
to implementation, albeit with a common focus on local government.  For instance, while east 
Asian countries have encouraged local authorities to invest in the institutional infrastructure 
needed for LED (Wade, 1983; Blecher, 1991; Kim, 1997) the government of India has tasked 
local government with LED planning and implementation  (Johnson, 2003; Narayana, 2005).  In 
another approach Indonesia‘s government has prompted local government to partner with civil 
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society and the private sector in the creation of regional linkages and responsive policies 
(Parray & Syebubaker, 2008).   
 
The formalisation of LED in Africa has however occurred at a slower pace than the rest of the 
developing world, with the exception of rapid LED growth in South Africa.  However, in their 
assessment of LED in southern Africa Rodriguez-Pose and Tijimstra (2006) argue that because of 
LED’s adaptability to local circumstances this approach has significant potential in the region.  
The authors highlight several specific examples of practical implementation including the use of 
stakeholder consultation to bring about sustainable waste management in Zimbabwe.  Their 
study also discusses the Zambian central governments relatively successful funding of LED 
programmes through the Social Investment Fund (ZAMSIF).  Finally, the authors examine LED in 
Mozambique where local stakeholders have partnered with universities, research institutes, 
and funding agencies to implement innovative strategies (van Boekel & van Logtestijn, 2002; 
Rodriguez-Pose & Tijimstra, 2006).  These examples illustrate the potential for LED in African 
economies and provide context for the increased focus on LED in South Africa.       
 
2.3. South Africa: Evolution of LED  
The practice of LED in South Africa is largely assumed to be a post-apartheid phenomenon.  
There is however a history of LED that stretches back nearly a century and reflects the changing 
political landscape and socio-economic priorities of that time.  The purpose of the current 
section is to briefly review this history in terms of both early LED initiatives and the emergence 
of ‘modern’ LED in the 1990s.  
 
2.3.1. Early Initiatives 
In South Africa the practice of LED dates back to fledgling attempts at local ‘boosterism’ 
undertaken by municipal governments in the 1920s and 1930s (Robinson, 1996; Nel & 
Rogerson, 1995, 1996, 2005a; Freund, 2002).  These initiatives sought to advance emerging 
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towns and cities and continued on an ad hoc basis until they were stifled in the early years of 
apartheid (Marais, 2010). At this time local authority and autonomy was severely limited 
making it impossible for sub-national governments to implement meaningful development 
programmes (Nel, 1999; Marais, 2010).  The central government also suppressed community 
based efforts and subjected the few that persisted to a large amount of scrutiny (Nel & 
McQuaid, 2002).   
 
The apartheid government did however utilise LED strategies in the economic promotion of the 
former ‘bantustans’, which were intended to operate as ‘independent’ states (Wilsenach & 
Ligthelm, 1993).  These strategies included the creation of a centrally administered Border 
Industry Programme, introduced in 1956 (Rogerson, 1994c).  This programme was the 
predecessor of the Regional Industrial Development Programme (RIDP) which provided 
generous incentives for manufacturing in areas bordering or within the bantustans (Rogerson, 
1994c).  Although the RIDP successfully promoted investment in the country’s poor peripheral 
areas it was criticised for funding unsustainable initiatives, failing to link investment with 
community development, and creating only low-skilled, poor paying jobs (Rogerson, 1994c; 
Padayachee, 2006).  
 
In 1989 the government enlisted the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) and Urban 
Foundation to investigate RIDP reforms leading to the re-allocation of programme funding to 
areas with greater economic potential (DBSA, 1989; Urban Foundation, 1991; Bell, 1997).  
Although the new programme was cancelled after failing to offset factory closures and job 
losses it did mark an important shift in South Africa from socio-political to economic 
development planning (Wilsenach & Ligthelm, 1993; Rogerson, 1994c; Hirsch, 2005).    
Incidentally, cancellation of the RIDP also coincided with the advent of democratic rule and the 
complete transformation of South Africa’s socio-economic strategy.  
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2.3.2. LED in the Transition Years    
The transition to democracy in the mid-1990s prompted a radical transformation in South 
Africa’s development policy and planning (Nel & Humphrys, 1999; Rogerson, 2006a, 2010a; 
Harrison et al, 2008; Human et al, 2008; Malefane, 2009).  This was accompanied by the 
promotion of LED by key national organisations, namely the Urban Foundation, South African 
National Civic Organisation (SANCO) and the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) Ministry (Nel & John, 2006).  These organisations sought to influence government’s take 
on LED by providing analysis of international best practices, discussion of interventions and 
implementation, and an introduction to the practical challenges of LED (Nel & John, 2006).  
  
The potential impact of LED in South Africa was also recognised by the private sector and civil 
society which drafted advisory documents designed to influence government strategy 
(Rogerson, 2002a).  The first document was presented in 1994 by representatives from the 
private sector and favoured a market-based approach to LED, designed to enhance 
competitiveness and attract investment (Rogerson, 2002a; Simon, 2003).  The second 
document, produced later that year, was presented by SANCO and advocated a people-centred 
approach that focused on community development and poverty alleviation (Nel et al, 2009).  
Interestingly, although the two papers promoted very different objectives and interventions to 
LED both found an audience in government (Nel et al, 2009).   
 
2.4. South Africa: LED Policy Framework 
The implementation of LED in South Africa’s first years of democracy was guided by strategies 
around the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was adopted by 
government in 1994 (Rogerson, 1997a).  In theory, this programme aligned closely to SANCOs 
pro-poor objectives however in practice LED took a back seat to affordable housing and 
infrastructure provision (Patterson, 2008).  By 1996, before LED could take root within the RDP 
framework, government introduced the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
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Strategy.  This strategy promoted a market-based, neo-liberal economic policy, aligned much 
more to the private sectors pro-growth LED objectives (Nel et al, 2009).   
 
The debate over which form LED should take was framed not only by private and civil sector 
interests but also the various mandates within government. In South Africa the two 
departments with the greatest authority over LED are the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) and the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) (Rogerson, 2008).  The 
DTI, which is responsible for commercial and industrial policy, advocated that LED should focus 
on the promotion of economic growth, investment and trade (Patterson, 2008).  Policy 
documents to this effect included the Micro Economic Reform Strategy (MERS) (DTI, 2002) 
which emphasised public-private interventions, and the Draft Regional Industrial Development 
Strategy (RIDS) which prioritised the exploitation of local competitive advantages (DTI, 2006).   
 
The DPLG, whose mandate it is to support sub-national governments, advocated a pro-poor 
approach to LED described by Bond (2002) as “progressive” and “developmental”.  These 
priorities were reflected in two DPLG policy documents, namely ‘Refocusing Development on 
the Poor’ (DPLG, 2001) and ‘Policy Guidelines for Implementing LED in South Africa’ (DPLG, 
2005).   The first document prioritised the development of localities through improved service 
delivery, human resource development and the promotion of local enterprise (Bond, 2002; 
Hindson et al, 2005).  The second ‘Policy Guidelines’ emphasised enterprise development, Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE), and the integration of the formal and informal economies 
(Hindson et al, 2005). 
 
There is consensus that the tension between the South African governments market oriented 
and pro-poor policies has had an impact on the success of LED, however the strength of this 
impact is debated.  According to Tomlinson (2003) the division between DPLG and DTI 
approaches left local authorities with great uncertainty over how to implement LED while Nel 
(2009) argues that this resulted in smaller municipalities accomplishing much less than those 
with greater resources.  On the other hand, Rogerson (2000) credits the range of interventions 
 
17 | P a g e  
 
 
made possible by the DTI and DPLG with enhancing LED in major cities. Finally, Bond (2002) 
contends that many municipalities skirted the lack of cohesive policy and instead took direction 
from whichever draft documents best suited their development needs.     
 
In recent years the South African government has sought to repair this discord and create a 
unified and holistic LED strategy through cooperation between the DPLG and DTI (Rogerson, 
2008).  In practice, the DPLG’s 2005 Policy Guidelines signalled a shift in the Departments 
thinking towards a more market-based LED approach, prompted by the mediocre achievements 
of community based initiatives and funds (Rogerson, 2008; Nel et al, 2009).  Simultaneously, 
the DTI signalled its support for poverty alleviation measures by participating in drafting the 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGI-SA), which formed a strategy for halving 
poverty and unemployment by 2014 (DTI, 2005).  This marked a subtle but important 
movement by the DTI towards an increasingly pro-poor approach.   
 
The shift in focus of DPLG and DTI policies formed the foundation for what Rogerson called a 
“forward movement in the progress of LED activities and practice” (Rogerson, 2011, p.152).  
This movement was most clearly demonstrated by the National Framework for LED, drafted in 
2006 by representatives from the DPLG, DTI and the South African Local Government 
Association (SALGA) (RSA, 2006a).  This document presented a united LED strategy that 
addressed both pro-growth and pro-poor objectives however it was criticised by leading LED 
scholars for failing to provide workable strategies (Rogerson, 2006; Nel, 2009).  More 
specifically, Nel et al (2009) argues that the framework was a diluted approach ‘lacking the 
teeth’ of previous drafts, while Rogerson (2006, p.408) claims that it “emphasises a strong pro-
poor focus in rhetoric, albeit if not always in practice.” 
 
2.5. South Africa: LED Stakeholders 
The planning and implementation of LED in South Africa involves various stakeholders from 
government, the private sector and civil society.  The purpose of this sub-section is to review 
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the role of these stakeholders and their impact on LED outcomes.  This understanding is 
particularly relevant for the current study which looks at LED project implementation by all 
three groups.  
 
2.5.1. The Role of Government 
The planning, financing and implementation of LED is facilitated to varying degrees by all levels 
of government (Rogerson, 1999b; Nel, 2001).  The role of central government includes the 
formation of an informed policy framework; the devolution of power and resources to sub-
national governments; and the design, funding and implementation of national LED 
programmes (Nel, 2001; Patterson, 2008).  Provincial governments are then tasked with 
facilitating national LED objectives by fulfilling similar responsibilities within their province 
(Rogerson, 2010a).  Finally, at the district and local level government is responsible for creating 
an enabling environment; establishing well-resourced and capacitated LED units; and 
implementing strategic directives and projects (Nel & Humphrys, 1999; Patterson, 2008).  
 
In South Africa Rogerson (2010a) argues that the experience of LED has highlighted the need for 
central and provincial government to assume leadership roles in order to capacitate effective 
implementation at the local level.  However, despite their important role, the central 
government is often criticised for its lack of policy focus (Tomlinson, 2003; Nel et al, 2009); 
inadequate devolution of resources (Mukhopadhyay, 2000); and promotion of ineffective and 
unsustainable LED programmes (Patterson, 2008).  At the provincial level, although outcomes 
vary significantly, complaints of ineffective strategies, insufficient funding and unsustainable 
programmes are also common (Nel, 2001).  
 
The responsibility for implementing LED, although guided by national and provincial strategies, 
rests primarily with district and local government (Rogerson, 1999b; Nel et al, 2009).  Some 
scholars argue that local government is the most capable of achieving implementation due to 
their local accountability and integration, as well as their involvement in the private sector 
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through taxation, infrastructure and regulatory functions (Cunningham & Meyer-Stamer, 2005).  
Others however are more critical of local government’s lack of bureaucratic competence, 
especially in the developing world (Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004).  This debate is also present 
within South Africa where critics argue that the ‘developmental’ role of local government, 
bestowed on municipalities in the 1998 Local Government White Paper (RSA, 1998), remains 
largely unfulfilled (Patterson, 2008; Rogerson, 2011).  
 
The argument that local government in South Africa is unable to implement LED is put forth by 
many regional scholars.  Their failure is attributed to an overall lack of capacity, skills and 
experience, exacerbated by high staff turnover (Nel & Humphrys, 1999; Mitchell, 2007).  These 
conditions have essentially created what Binns and Nel (2002c) call a “capacity crisis” in many 
smaller municipalities.  Another key constraint on local government is the insufficient funding 
to provide staff training, establish effective LED units and finance projects (Nel & Humphrys 
1999; Nel, 2001; Nel et al, 2006), which Mukhopadhyay (2000, p.29) argues amounts to a 
“devolution of responsibility without resources”.  
 
These capacity constraints and shallow resources have created a situation where many 
question the current role of local government in LED (Binns & Nel, 2002c).  The most common 
prescription for this is that local government should act as LED facilitators rather than active 
participants in the process (Nel & Rogerson, 2005a; Rogerson, 2010a).  This would involve the 
creation of an enabling environment through service delivery and addressing market failures 
(Binns & Nel, 2002c; Cunningham & Meyer-Stamer, 2005; Nel & Rogerson, 2005a).  Another 
recommendation is that local government should focus on the creation of meaningful, 
institutional partnerships with both the private sector and civil society (Patterson, 2008; 
Lawrence, 2010).  To achieve this Nel and Humphrys (1999) argued that South African policy 
and legislation must actively encourage the participation of other stakeholders in LED.     
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2.5.2. Private Sector Participation  
International and South African experience has illustrated the important role of the private 
sector in terms of advancing LED (Nel, 2001).  The private sector promotes sustainable LED 
through the identification of opportunities; promotion of business retention and expansion; 
and the implementation of sustainable joint LED projects (RSA, 2006b; Patterson, 2008).  The 
business community also benefits from the outcomes of LED including improved business 
infrastructure and service delivery, a higher skilled workforce, and the removal of market 
barriers (Fosler, 1991; Abrahams, 2003).   In South Africa, the National Framework for LED (RSA, 
2006a) recognises the mutual benefits of private sector involvement and provides strategies for 
stimulating investment and promoting partnership formation.    
 
The emphasis on partnership formation in South Africa has however failed to remove the 
obstacles to meaningful private sector participation (Nel et al, 2009).  The first obstacle is the 
perceived emphasis on community initiatives over those that prioritise economic growth, 
especially in marginalised and rural areas (MXA, 2003; Cohen, 2010).  This is attributed to the 
historic division between local authorities and predominantly white business owners (Rogerson, 
2010c, 2010d); the fear of political repercussions if authorities favour economic interests over 
their pro-poor agenda (Mitchell, 2009); and the culture of mistrust between the public and 
private sectors (Patterson, 2008). A second obstacle to private sector involvement is the skills 
gap between business and its partners in government and civil society (Mitchell, 2007).  To 
overcome these constraints LED partnerships must involve increased dialogue, skills transfer 
and the clarification of roles, responsibilities and expectations.      
 
2.5.3. Civil Society Involvement 
Civil Society plays an important role in stimulating and implementing LED, as well as ensuring 
that the local community is involved in the process and shares in the outcomes (Nel, 2001).  In 
South Africa, community organisations, local forums and NGOs play an especially important 
role in facilitating pro-poor, co-operative and SMME development (Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992). 
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These groups prioritise the use of local resources, skills development and an improvement in 
the communities’ quality of life (Binns & Nel, 1999).  They typically receive modest support 
from domestic and international donors, while the majority of funding comes from partnerships 
with local government and the private sector (Nel, 2001).  
 
In South Africa civil society has had notable success at implementing LED in marginalised 
communities, especially when projects are headed by devoted individuals in areas with 
competent local authorities, minimal red tape and strong community relationships (Binns & 
Nel, 2002c).  There is however the reality that community based initiatives without the support 
of government or the private sector tend to remain small scale with limited potential for 
sustainability and replication (Nel, 1999).  Thus, it is important for government, the private 
sector and civil society to collaborate in the design and implementation of LED to ensure 
sustainable outcomes and shared benefits.  
 
2.6 South Africa: LED Objectives  
In South Africa the design and implementation of LED interventions largely reflects the divide 
between pro-growth and pro-poor objectives (Marriot, 2004).  The pro-growth approach 
advocates for the promotion of LED through enhanced competitiveness, global market 
integration, and investment attraction (Nel & Rogerson, 2005a; Patterson, 2008).  It typically 
involves partnership with the private sector and is often financed in part by central, provincial 
or municipal government (Lopez, 2010).  In contrast, the pro-poor approach argues that LED 
should directly target marginalised individuals and communities in pursuit of objectives such as 
meaningful job creation, sustainable rural development, and urban renewal (Bond, 2003; 
Patterson, 2008).   These initiatives are generally implemented by NGOs, community, church or 
women’s groups, and civil society organisations (Bond, 2003).   
 
There is significant debate in South Africa regarding which LED objectives should be prioritised 
by the countries policies, programmes and projects (Bond, 2000).  In the literature many 
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theorists have expressed concern about the preference for economic growth over poverty 
alleviation (Bond, 2000, 2002; Meyer-Stamer, 2002, 2003a; Marais & Botes, 2007), while also 
maintaining that a strictly pro-poor approach is unlikely to generate sustainable economic 
development (Meyer-Stamer, 2003b).  There are also those who argue profess the fundamental 
contradiction between pro-growth and pro-poor objectives (Marais, 1998; Cashdan, 2002).  This 
sub-section provides an overview of South Africa’s pro-growth and pro-poor LED objectives, 
with specific interventions discussed later in the review.  
 
2.6.1. Pro-Growth LED 
The practice of pro-growth LED emerged in South African cities during the early and mid-1990s 
as a result of economic decline, increased global competition and the demand for racial and 
spatial integration (Bond, 2003; Patterson, 2008).  One of the key objectives of these projects 
was the promotion of industrial development and agglomeration economies, especially in the 
manufacturing sector (Morris & Barnes, 2006).  In addition to boosting local economies and job 
creation these initiatives sought to create knowledge spill-overs, collective learning, specialised 
labour inputs, and enhanced firm efficiency (McCormick, 1999; Helmsing, 2001; 2003; Machako 
& Roberts, 2004; Morris & Barnes, 2006; Rogerson, 2008).   
 
In the aftermath of apartheid South Africa’s cities also turned to growth-oriented LED to 
achieve enhanced competitiveness in national and global markets (Nel & Rogerson, 2005a).  
This included interventions such as the development of public-private partnerships which 
provide targeted investment, promote regulatory reform, and enhance economic growth 
(DPLG, 2008; Rogerson, 2010b).  It also involved efforts to develop a sophisticated services 
sector through the attraction and retention of highly skilled workers, creation of knowledge 
networks, and promotion of research and development (Rogerson, 2006a; OECD, 2008).   
Finally, stakeholders in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban competed to attract tourists, 
multinational businesses and international conventions (Rogerson, 2000, 2002; Rogerson & 
Visser, 2007; Moodley, 2009).   
 




The promotion of pro-growth LED is also practiced in South Africa’s secondary cities, outlying 
areas, and under-developed regions.  Early interventions included the creation of Industrial 
Development Zones (IDZs) which sought to increase local efficiency, competitiveness, exports 
and jobs (Rogerson, 1999a; Nel, 2000).  The government also established Spatial Development 
Initiatives (SDIs) which promote the sustainable development of an area by identifying growth 
opportunities and removing investment barriers (Jourdan et al, 1996; Jourdan, 1998).  Finally, in 
2012 the South African Government began issuing plans for the creation of Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) which will effectively replace the IDZs and place greater emphasis on innovation in 
peri-urban areas (DTI, 2012). 
 
In South Africa’s rural areas and communities the pro-growth approach has generally lacked an 
audience among rural LED practitioners, local authorities, and community groups (Abrahams, 
2003).  Despite this, authors such as Meyer-Stamer (2003) argue the importance of a growth-
oriented approach that targets enterprise development by addressing market failures, 
identifying business opportunities, and increasing private sector involvement (Meyer-Stamer, 
2003).   Recently this approach has been applied to projects that promote niche agriculture 
markets, the development of green energy and biofuels, and the formation of tourism 
partnerships (Kepe et al, 2009; Meyer et al, 2009).   
 
2.6.2. Pro-Poor LED 
In contrast to the urban and regional focus of pro-growth LED, pro-poor interventions tend to 
address rural and small town development (Abrahams, 2003).  These efforts focus on poverty 
alleviation and capacity enhancement (Moser, 1996, 1998) through the promotion of savings 
collectives and informal lending; improvements to housing, infrastructure and basic services; 
and support for economic initiatives through grant funding, skills training, micro-finance and 
the creation of  new markets (Bond, 2002; Helmsing, 2003).  However, the lack of 
infrastructure, low tax revenue and capacity shortages in these areas has resulted in few 
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examples of successful LED implementation (Meyer-Stamer, 2002; Marais & Botes, 2007; Nel, 
2007; Human et al, 2008; Rogerson, 2008; Cohen, 2010).   
 
The general lack of successful LED in South Africa’s rural areas has led to a “legacy of support 
for unsustainable, low-skilled community projects which has negatively impacted perceptions 
of the efficacy of LED” (Nel et al, 2006).  This reality has prompted some to argue that 
stakeholders and policy makers need to be more realistic about the potential for development 
in their communities (Filion, 1998).  Thus, in the last decade many of these areas have shifted 
their focus to a people-centred approach that prioritises human capital development, SMME 
growth, public-private partnerships and targeted investment (World Bank, 2001; Abrahams, 
2003; Rogerson, 2005, 2011; Nel and Rogerson, 2005a).   
 
The outcome of this LED shift is an increased focus on demand-driven production as well as the 
attraction of private sector investment and knowledge (Patterson, 2008).  In South Africa’s rural 
areas and small towns the most sustainable of these initiatives have operated in the tourism 
and agriculture sectors (GGLN, 2008).   The success of tourism projects is derived from direct 
revenue as well as the development of local supply chains (Meyer et al, 2004; Mitchell and 
Ashley, 2010) and has sparked several studies on the potential for agricultural, ecological and 
volunteer based tourism projects (Binns & Nel, 2002d; Rogerson, 2002b, 2002).  However their 
viability requires identifiable markets, private sector involvement, adequate local skills, and 
effective land reform processes (Philander & Rogerson, 2001; Nel, 2006). 
In South Africa although the pro-poor approach is dominant in rural and small town LED 
programmes there is also demand for these initiatives in urban centres (Rogerson, 2010, 2011).  
The opportunities for pro-poor LED in cities include improved service delivery (Bond, 2003); the 
demarcation of land for urban agriculture (Rogerson, 1999b, 2011); and zoning changes that 
will promote the development of small and micro businesses (Rogerson, 1999b, 2010, 2011).  
Partnerships between the city and service providers can also facilitate better opportunities for 
entrepreneurs and street traders through skills transfer, mentorship, and the development of 
formal markets (Skinner, 2000; Skinner & Valodia, 2003).  Finally, central and local governments 
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can co-finance public work projects that improve infrastructure and create local jobs (Binns & 
Nel, 2003; Rogerson, 2011).  
 
2.7. South Africa: LED Interventions 
The pursuit of pro-growth and pro-poor LED objectives has resulted in a myriad of programmes 
in all areas of South Africa including large cities, smaller urban centres and outlying areas, and 
rural communities.  This section provides an overview of some of the better documented 
interventions.  The lessons learned from these interventions are often incorporated into new 
LED programmes such as Gijima KZN.   
 
2.7.1. Large Urban Centres 
The practice of LED by municipal governments became wide-spread in South Africa’s large cities 
in the early and mid-1990s (Rogerson 1997a, 2011; Nel, 2001). In Cape Town the municipality 
embarked on large-scale tourism projects including the V&A Waterfront and the International 
Convention Centre (Nel, 2001).  Similar initiatives aimed at boosting domestic, international and 
business tourism were mirrored by the Durban Municipality (Maharaj, 1998). South African 
cities also sought to entice investment in technology and manufacturing.  For instance Cape 
Town courted emerging sector businesses (Rogerson, 2002d), Pretoria’s city officials prioritised 
high-technology manufacturing, and Port Elizabeth pursued investment by general industry 
(Rogerson, 1997a).      
 
In Johannesburg, the country’s largest urban centre, LED was stimulated by a need to address 
the cities ‘pariah’ image following the end of apartheid (Fitzsimons, 1995; Rogerson, 1996b).  
The city also pursued LED in an attempt at urban renewal following the decline in 
manufacturing, increased unemployment, and the inner-city flight of many corporate head 
offices (Rogerson & Rogerson, 1995; Rogerson, 1996a, 1996b).  To attract new interest in the 
CBD authorities embarked on a campaign to brand post-apartheid Johannesburg as a prime 
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location for the regional headquarters of international business and organisations (Rogerson 
1997b, 2000).  Initiatives included extensive commercial property development, residential 
upgrades, and investment in transportation infrastructure (Nel, 2001).  
 
There are also several pro-poor LED initiatives that that have been put into practice in South 
Africa’s large urban centres.  In Cape Town examples of pro-poor LED include expanded public 
works (Parnell et al, 2005) and urban cultivation projects (Rogerson, 2010b).  In both Durban 
and Johannesburg pro-poor city planning has involved inner-city renewal strategies and sector 
targeting (Khosa & Naidoo, 1998; Bremmer, 2000; Rogerson, 2002c, 2003a).  The best 
documented example of this is the enhanced competition and job creation produced by 
industrial clusters in Johannesburg’s fashion district (Rogerson, 2001a, 2004; Cachia et al, 
2004).  Finally, Parnell (2004) argues that meaningful poverty reduction in Johannesburg 
required the coordination and scaling up of LED strategies under a single development agenda.  
 
2.7.2. Secondary Cities and Towns  
In the mid-1990s several smaller cities and towns also looked to LED to address their own 
economic crises, particularly those areas facing decline in their key industry (Binns & Nel, 
2002a).  In the mining towns of Kimberley, Klerksdorp and Welkom municipal authorities 
sought to attract manufacturing businesses to offset the impact of mine closures (Mosiane, 
2000; Binns and Nel, 2002a; Nel & Hill, 2003).  In Middleburg and Newcastle authorities 
launched campaigns to stimulate new investment in response to rapid decline in the local steel 
sector (Dauskardt, 1994; Mcdonald, 1996).  Finally, in reaction to their diminished fishing 
industry the coastal towns of Stilbaai and Lamberts Bay implemented LED through community 
programmes, place marketing, and tourism promotion (Rogerson, 1997a, 2000; Nel, 2001; 
Binns & Nel, 2002d).   
 
In other peripheral areas LED was prompted not only by social and economic crisis but also by 
the need to address the rapid increase in violence and crime (Rogerson, 1997a).  One of the 
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first documented examples of this is the small city of Atlantis, a ‘coloured’ town created by 
apartheid spatial planners north of Cape Town (Rogerson, 1997a).   Nel and Meston (1996) have 
carefully chronicled and praised the community’s LED initiatives, which include creation of a 
business centre and development forum. This review was one of the first comprehensive 
assessments of small town and pro-poor South African LED.  It is however an inescapable reality 
that the removal of industrial subsidies in Atlantis has resulted in numerous factory closures 
and an incredibly high jobless rates (Sunday Times, 2012) despite community efforts.   
 
The most celebrated example of LED in a small South African city or town was that of 
Stutterheim in the Eastern Cape (Tandy, 1992; Bond, 1998).  In Stutterheim the community 
embarked on a range of LED initiatives spearheaded by the Stutterheim Development 
Foundation and designed to address racial, spatial and economic inequalities (Tandy, 1992).  
Initially, these initiatives were praised by Tandy (1992) as ‘innovative’; by Nussbaum (1997) for 
being ‘inclusive’; and Nel (1994, p.35) as a “model for racial reconciliation and locality based 
development”. However, as the glow of LED efforts faded others including Bond (1998) 
criticised the town’s initiatives for consisting primarily of discrete, largely unsustainable 
projects. 
 
2.7.3. Regions and Corridors  
In the aftermath of apartheid regional economic growth and development was encouraged in 
specific areas through the promotion of export manufacturing and job creation (Rogerson, 
1999a). Initially, the most notable of these efforts was the establishment of Industrial 
Development Zones (IDZs) such as the Coega and East London IDZs, both of which are located in 
the severely underdeveloped Eastern Cape. These IDZs were funded by government and 
provided incentives for industrial development and employment creation with the intention of 
enhancing local efficiency and competitiveness (Rogerson, 1999a; Nel, 2000). They were 
criticised, however, for producing limited, expensive and often temporary jobs with little skills 
development (Bond, 2002).   
 




The South African government has also promoted corridor development, typically along major 
transportation routes, through the creation of Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) (Farooki, 
2009). These SDIs are given significant short-term funding with the intention of increasing 
private sector investment, stimulating small business activity, and enhancing community 
empowerment (Jourdan et al, 1996).  Several examples of SDIs include the KwaZulu-Natal 
Lubombo SDI and the Maputo Development Corridor.  As with the IDZs there are those who 
argue that the SDIs contribute significantly to regional and local development (Rogerson, 
2001b), while others criticise their top-down character, lack of market integration, 
environmental consequences, and high job creation costs (Pape, 2001; Bond, 2002).  
 
2.7.4. Rural Areas and Communities 
In South Africa the development challenges of high poverty, low skills development, poor 
infrastructure and limited resources are felt most severely in rural areas and communities, 
especially in the former Homelands (Du Toit, 2005). These areas also suffer so severely from 
lack of economic opportunity that in many areas residents subsist on social grants and 
remittances from migrant workers (Neves et al, 2009). The practice of LED therefore aims to 
create supplementary income and is typically initiated by women’s groups and co-operatives 
(Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992; Brown, 1995).   
 
In the early and mid-1990s rural LED ventures consisted predominantly of small-scale 
agricultural initiatives (Nel & McQuaid, 2002; Nel et al, 2006). The Mpofu District Municipality 
in the Eastern Cape provides several successful examples. These include the Philani Community 
Development Project which focused on small-scale farming and agro-tourism, the women’s 
Zamukphila Co-operative which produced vegetables for commercial sale, and the Hertzog 
Agricultural Co-operative which employed existing skills and infrastructure (Binns & Nel, 1999; 
Nel, 2001).  The challenges and successes of these initiatives highlight the need for strong 
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community leadership, cooperation and vision, as well as the importance of external support, 
advice and funding (Binns & Nel, 1999).  
 
In the past decade the establishment of rural tourism routes has also become a common 
approach to LED (Rogerson, 2006c; ECI, 2006; Lourens, 2007a, 2007b). The motivation for these 
routes stems from their ability to increase the viability of “marginalised areas, stimulating social 
regeneration and improving the living conditions of rural communities” (Briedenhann & 
Wickens, 2004, p.71).  Additional LED advantages include the benefits of collective marketing, 
business cluster development, and the creation of entrepreneurial opportunities (Briedenhann 
& Wickens, 2004; Rogerson, 2007). In South Africa examples of successful tourism routes 
include the Mothers of Creation route in the Western Cape (Lourens, 2007b); the eco-tourism 
based Ivory Route in the Limpopo Province (ECI Africa, 2006) and the Amathole Mountain 
Escape and Wild Coast Meander routes in the Eastern Cape, which provide a market for tourism 
in otherwise remote villages (Rogerson, 2003b; ECI Africa, 2006).  
 
The literature on LED in South Africa’s cities, towns and rural areas during the time of political 
transition reveals that although their motivations were often similar they differed considerably 
in their resources, approach and outcomes. In all areas LED was seen as a response to economic 
hardship and unemployment using local resources and knowledge (Nel, 2001).  However, due 
to funding and capacity constraints smaller communities and rural areas generally achieved 
much less through LED than urban centres (Nel, 2001; Hindson, 2003; Nel & Rogerson, 2005a, 
2007; Rogerson, 2006a). This uneven performance has increased the countries spatial 
inequality and fuelled protests against poor service delivery in smaller communities (Legassick, 
2010).   
 
2.8. South Africa: Grant Funded Initiatives   
The implementation of successful LED requires the commitment of significant economic 
resources (Samuelson, 1995; Servon, 1998).  In South Africa a common approach to funding LED 
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is the provision of grants to approved projects, either through a formal LED programme or on 
an ad-hoc basis (Patterson, 2008).  This funding is distributed by all three levels of government, 
big business, NGOs and development agencies (Nel & Humphrys, 1999; Patterson, 2008).  The 
recipients of these grants are tasked with planning and implementing the initiative and include 
municipalities, community organisations, small enterprise, and entrepreneurs (Blakely & Leigh, 
2009).  Although there is insufficient space for a full audit of these programmes a review of two 
relevant initiatives is provided.  
  
2.8.1. The LED Fund 
In South Africa grant funded LED is often measured against and cautioned by the outcomes of 
the LED Fund (LEDF).  The LEDF was a DPLG programme which operated from 1999 to 2002 and 
provided municipalities with grants of up to R1.5 million for job creation and poverty alleviation 
projects (DPLG, 2001).  The programme was very popular, receiving 827 applications in the first 
two years (Binns & Nel, 2002c). However, the vast majority of these applications and most 
funded projects came from well-resourced municipalities with experienced staff, private sector 
partnerships and close community ties, while the country’s poorest and least capacitated areas 
were largely absent from the process (Binns & Nel, 2002c). This revealed a catch-22 in South 
Africa’s LED approach where, by virtue of their poverty, areas with the greatest need had the 
least access to funds.     
 
The LED Fund was not only disappointing in its dispersal but also in its outcomes producing a 
host of small, unsustainable projects with little impact on poverty and unemployment (Marais 
& Botes, 2007; Patterson, 2008; Cohen, 2010; Rogerson, 2010a). These poor results are 
attributed to a lack of municipal capacity and vague understanding of what LED is (Marais & 
Bores, 2007; Patterson, 2008). There was also little support in terms of market research, 
technical assistance, and monitoring and evaluation (MXA, 2003; Patterson, 2008).  Finally, few 
projects were financially sustainable as a result of poor management, insufficient markets and 
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the failure of local government to engage with beneficiaries and ensure projects would be 
carried on beyond exhaustion of the grant (Atkinson & Ingle, 2003).  
 
Despite the lack of tangible outcomes the LEDF has had a significant impact on the practice of 
LED and the provision of grant funding in South Africa. On the one hand it changed local 
government’s attitude towards LED, creating what Binns and Nel (2002c, p.9) call a “widespread 
crisis of expectation” among local government.  On the other hand, failure of the LEDF to meet 
its pro-poor mandate also prompted the DPLG to issue a more conservative, growth oriented 
LED policy in 2006 (Nel et al, 2009).  Finally, while the LEDF initiated the project-based approach 
to LED it also prompted caution in terms of the allocation of grant funding (Rogerson, 2011).  
 
2.8.2. The EU Funded LED Programme  
The European Union is South Africa’s largest development donor focusing on alleviating poverty 
though a variety of initiatives (EU, 2007). In 2001 the EU partnered with provincial departments 
in Limpopo, KZN and the Eastern Cape to launch three grant financed LED programmes. These 
programmes targeted marginalised areas, specifically rural and peri-urban communities, and 
sought to promote equitable growth, poverty alleviation and enhanced competitiveness (DEDT, 
2007; Patterson, 2008; Eastern Cape Provincial Government, 2011). Funding was divided in 
each province according to three objectives, namely capacity building in local government, 
business plan formation, and project implementation (DEDT, 2007; Patterson, 2008; Eastern 
Cape Provincial Government, 2011).   
 
The three provincial programmes, although based on the same principles, were implemented in 
various ways under diverse economic circumstances and their outcomes differ widely.  
Although no single review of the EU Programme was conducted individual assessments indicate 
that the Limpopo programme resulted in the weakest LED impact with slightly better results in 
the Eastern Cape and much better outcomes in KZN (Patterson, 2008; UKZN, 2011).  Overall the 
Limpopo and Eastern Cape programmes produced many unsuccessful projects, most of which 
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collapsed following exhaustion of the grants (Lyonette & Pearson, 2010; Marais 2010). The 
relatively poor outcomes in these two provinces is attributed to a lack of capacity in provincial 
government as well as the inability of many programme applicants to secure co-funding (G. 
McDonald, 2011, pers. comm.).   
 
In KZN the EU Programme was implemented in joint effort with the Provincial DEDT and was 
known as the Gijima KZN Programme.  As discussed earlier, the programme consisted of three 
separate funds, the Business Enabling Fund (BEF), Competitiveness Action Plan (CAP) and the 
Local Competitiveness Fund Implementation (LCFI) (DEDT, 2007). The first two programmes 
sought to enable business development by funding public sector projects and business plan 
creation (DEDT, 2004). A review of the BEF and CAP funds praises their innovative approach to 
non-metropolitan LED, the employment of stricter funding criteria, and increased private and 
civil sector involvement (Marais, 2010). The review also criticises these two funds however for 
their supply-driven approach, which relied heavily on consultants and did little to enhance 
access for the poor (Marais, 2010). This was linked to a lack of planning and little consideration 
for international development trends, risk assessment and ensuring sustainability (Marais, 
2010).  
 
The LCFI was the third fund in the programme Gijima KZN and is the focus of this study. It 
provided grant funding for the implementation of LED projects with the aim of simultaneously 
achieving economic development and poverty alleviation (DEDT, 2004). A socio-economic 
impact assessment of the LCFI concluded that it had the greatest impact of the three Gijima 
KZN funds, noting that it was one of South Africa’s most successful LED interventions to date 
(UKZN, 2011).  The LCFI is specifically praised for creating a notable number of jobs, especially 
in light of the recession; promoting partnership formation between emerging businesses and 
local communities; and allowing for the successful up-scaling of existing enterprise (UKZN, 
2011).  The impact assessment concluded by declaring the LCFI a “very significant intervention 
in terms of its scale and its approach” (UKZN, 2011, p.96).   
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The impact assessment also identified several problems in terms of programme design and 
implementation. It noted that the LCFI fund was constrained by the administrative burden 
placed on applicants and grant recipients, as well as the perceived lack of ‘on the ground’ 
understanding by Gijima KZN staff (UKZN, 2011).  In terms of the socio-economic impact of the 
LCFI the assessment concluded that this was limited due to unrealistic objectives, the 
unpreparedness of project managers, inconsistent financial commitment by grant recipients, 
weak partnerships, and ineffective mechanisms for involving beneficiaries (UKZN, 2011).  
Finally, the LCFI impact assessment questioned whether grant funding is the most appropriate 
mechanism for promoting LED given existing market barriers (UKZN, 2011).   
 
2.8.3. The Role of Co-funding 
The promotion of successful LED through grant financing faces several significant challenges.  
These challenges are often related to the mismatch between project and programme objectives 
as well as a lack of capacity and commitment on behalf of the implementing partner (Marais & 
Botes, 2007; Marais, 2010; UKZN, 2011).  To address this issue it is increasingly common for 
grant programmes, such as the Gijima KZN LCFI, to require some degree of co-funding from 
grant recipients (R. Persad, 2011, pers. comm.).  These co-funding requirements are the main 
focus of the current study. Thus, the purpose of this section is to provide background to the 
issue of co-funding in South African LED and establish the wider applicability of this research.  
 
The South African government, development banks and private sector operate a range of LED 
grant programmes that employ co-funding requirements. These include the DTIs Co-operative 
Incentive Scheme (CIS), Manufacturing and Tourism Investment Programmes (MIP and TIP), and 
the Black Business Supplier Development Programme (BBSDP) which require 10%, 30% and 50% 
co-funding respectively (DTI, 2011). The DBSA and government have also partnered in the 9 
billion rand Jobs Fund, which provides 50% co-financing for job creation initiatives (DBSA, 
2011). Finally, the Business Trust Shared Growth Challenge Fund redistributes R35.5 million in 
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private sector contributions to small business through the provision of 50/50 cost-sharing 
grants (Business Trust, 2011).   
 
The South African LED grant system therefore relies heavily on co-funding as a risk sharing 
mechanism. However, despite this there has been limited research into the applicability of co-
funding and its impact on programme success. This research gap forms part of what Rogerson 
(2006a) describes as the need for investigation into South Africa’s LED funding arrangements. 
This lack of investigation is also acknowledged by Diaz & Hansel (2007, p.2) who describe the 
study of “risk sharing arrangements in weaker, fragmented value chains” as an area requiring 
further research. The current study seeks to address this gap through the investigation of co-
funding arrangements in the Gijima KZN LCFI programme. 
 
2.9. International Norms: Shaping LED in South Africa   
The preceding review highlighted the important role of international experience and 
government policy directives in shaping South African LED (Nel & John, 2006).  The greatest 
practical influence has come from the US and UK which possess a wealth of LED knowledge, as 
well as Australia where response to small town decline was similar to that of South Africa 
(Rogerson, 2009).  In terms of policy however the LED framework for South Africa oscillated 
between the internationally endorsed emphasis on growth and the domestic demand for 
poverty alleviation (Nel, 2001; Rogerson, 2003b). This attempted reconciliation between 
international best practices and practical local challenges is reflected in the design of the Gijima 
KZN programme.    
 
The implementation of pro-growth LED occurred primarily in South Africa’s cities and 
marginalised areas and involved approaches similar to those pursued in the US in the 1970s 
(Clark & Gaile, 1998).  On the other hand many small towns and rural areas diverged from 
international norms by emphasising poverty alleviation which culminated in the creation of the 
LED Fund (LEDF) (Rogerson, 2010a).  The LEDF provided national funding for local initiatives, an 
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approach common in the US and UK but a relative first in South Africa (Binns and Nel, 2002c).  It 
differed from the US and UK model however in its reliance on competitive assessment rather 
than rigid funding criteria (Binns and Nel, 2002c; Atkinson & Ingle, 2003).  This provided local 
authorities a level of autonomy more in line with the experience of French, Spanish and 
Portuguese cities in the 1980s (Moulaert & Demaziere, 1995; Binns & Nel, 2002c). This 
approach was adopted by Gijima KZN for their competitively allocated LCFI programme which 
extended grant funding beyond local government to include the private sector and civil society.  
 
In recent years the LED process in South Africa has incorporated many of the modern priorities 
of the developed world. According to Nel (2007) this includes an emphasis on aligning 
government strategies, improving quality of life, and targeting specific areas and industries.  
However, Nel (2007) goes on to argue that there is little progress in terms of partnership 
formation, knowledge sharing, skills development and technology transfer. At present the 
literature suggests that the most distinct features of LED in South Africa include the focus on 
poverty alleviation, economic integration, and the reliance on local government regardless of 
demonstrated capacity constraints (Binns & Nel, 2002c; Patterson, 2008; Rogerson, 2011).  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK – AGENCY THEORY 
The theoretical framework for this study is based on agency theory, which seeks to reconcile 
problems that arise in the principal-agent relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989). This chapter provides 
an overview of the theories origins and applications including those related to the current 
study. It also includes a detailed description of the theory and associated concepts of 
asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard.  Finally, the application of agency 
theory to LED programme design is examined under the assumption that the objectives and risk 
preferences of the Gijima KZN programme are not clearly aligned to those of the grant 
recipients.    
 
3.1. Origins of Agency Theory  
The principal-agent relationship was first conceptualised in Berle and Means 1932 study of 
decision making patterns among a firm’s owners and managers.  This study looks specifically at 
the ‘agency problems’ that arise when business owners have less information and different 
objectives than the managers they employ.  In the late 1960s and early 1970s Wilson (1968) 
and Arrow (1971) introduced the concept of risk sharing to these discussions.  They defined risk 
sharing problems as the conflict that arises when two parties have different attitudes towards 
risk.  This coupling of agency problems and risk sharing laid the foundation for agency theory.  
 
The further articulation of agency theory is attributed to several key pieces. The first was 
Alchian and Demsetz’s 1972 study which employed agency theory in an analysis of teamwork 
productivity and the role of individual incentives and monitoring.  This was followed by Ross’s 
1973 article on agency theory and the principal’s selection of optimal compensation for the 
agent.  In 1976 Jensen and Meckling expanded on the idea of optimal compensation using the 
metaphor of a contract in what is typically considered the seminal piece on agency theory. 
Finally, in the mid to late-1980s Eisenhardt (1985, 1989) produced several articles discussing 
agency theory in great detail and clarifying its application to organisational economics. 
 




A review of agency theory is not complete however without discussing information asymmetry, 
a concept developed by Nobel Prize laureates Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz.  The concept of 
information asymmetry was introduced by Akerlof (1970) in his seminal piece on adverse 
selection in markets where the seller has more information about a product than the buyer.  
Spence (1973, 1974) expanded on these discussions of by demonstrating how agents can use 
‘signalling’ to counteract the effect of adverse selection.  Through signalling these agents are 
able to reassure the other party that their product or service is of a certain value.  Finally, 
through a series of articles Stiglitz and various co-authors (Sitglitz, 1974, 1979; Grossman & 
Stiglitz, 1976; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976) developed the concept of ‘screening’, which allows 
the principal to identify the agent’s attitude towards risk by offering a variety of contracts.   
 
3.2. The Principal-Agent Relationship 
The principal-agent relationship is one of the most pervasive forms of social interaction (Ross, 
1973).  It occurs in situations where one party, the principal, provides financial incentive to 
another party, the agent, to act on their behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shavell, 1979; Arrow, 
1985).  The principal-agent relationship occurs in almost all contractual arrangements including 
those between a seller and buyer, employer and employee, and a bank and client (Harris & 
Raviv, 1979; Bergen et al, 1992; Holland, 2006). In the current study the principal is represented 
by Gijima KZN while the agents are those receiving financial incentive in the form of an LCFI 
grant.  
 
The relationship between a principal and an agent is typically characterised by information 
asymmetries and different attitudes towards risk (Harris & Raviv, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Information asymmetries occur when the agent has greater knowledge about their actions and 
abilities than the principal which allows them to act in their own self-interest (Pratt & 
Zeckhauser, 1985; Waterman & Meier, 1998). These asymmetries are of particular concern in 
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situations where it is difficult or costly for the principal to monitor the agent’s actions or 
determine their true attributes (Holmstrom, 1979; Miller, 2005).   
 
In the principal-agent relationship it is also assumed that the agent is more risk-adverse than 
the principal (Shavell, 1979).  The rationale behind this assumption is that agents are less willing 
to take on risk because their welfare relies heavily on the specific outcomes of the arrangement 
while the principal is able to derive welfare from several sources (Hart & Holmstrom, 1987).  It 
is also assumed that the agent is reluctant to assume greater risk because of outcome 
uncertainty, implying that the outcome of each arrangement is influenced not only by their 
actions, effort and ability but also by exogenous factors such as government policy, 
technological advances, economic climate, and competitor behaviour (Leblebici & Schneck, 
1981; Dess & Beard, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989).      
 
The presence of information asymmetry and a risk-averse agent give rise to several problems in 
the principal-agent relationship, namely adverse selection and moral hazard (Rubin, 1978; 
Mathewson & Winter, 1985; Brickley & Dark, 1987).  The purpose of agency theory is to address 
these problems by determining the ideal contract between the two parties (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  The following sub-sections provide a description of adverse selection and moral hazard 
as well as the methods used to determine optimal contract arrangements. This is followed by 
an application of agency theory to the current study including justification for the use of this 
theory in designing grant funded programmes.       
 
3.2.1 Adverse Selection 
The problem of adverse selection arises in situations of information asymmetry where the 
agent is able to misrepresent their abilities or the quality of their product to the principal 
(Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Eisenhardt, 1989; Mishra et al, 1998).  This problem is resolved by 
the agent’s use of signals which Spence (1973) argues must be differentially costly in order to 
be effective.  In previous research these signals have included product warranties for consumer 
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goods (Cooper & Ross, 1985; Lutz, 1989), collateral in business and project financing (Barro, 
1976; Besanko & Thakor, 1987), and the education levels of job applicants (Spence, 1973; 
Shapiro, 1986).  
 
In the current study the potential for adverse selection arises when the agent, or grant 
beneficiary, exaggerates their projects potential and/or their ability to execute efficient 
implementation. In this scenario co-funding commitments represent a signal of the grant 
beneficiaries confidence and abilities.  Although this is the first application of adverse selection 
in a study of development project finance it has been used previously in research on 
entrepreneurship (Webb, 1991; Amit et al, 1993;), venture capital (Barry, 1994; Fried & Hisrich, 
1994; Cumming, 2006; Van Osnabruggae, 2010), and international development aid (Zetland, 
2007).  
 
3.2.2 Moral Hazard 
The issue of moral hazard is described by Holstrom (1979) as an ‘incentive problem’ that occurs 
in situations where the interests of two parties are not perfectly aligned and asymmetric 
information exists.  In the principal-agent relationship this is manifested as a lack of effort on 
behalf of the agent which results in sub-optimal outcomes (Allen, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Moral hazard is overcome either through the principals careful monitoring of the agent’s 
actions or the transfer of some risk from the principal to the agent (Harris & Raviv, 1979; 
Shavel, 1979; Grossman & Hart, 1983).   
 
In the current study moral hazard occurs when the agent, or grant recipient, puts less effort 
into the implementation of their project then what is expected by the principal, Gijima KZN.  In 
this scenario the potential for moral hazard is heightened when the projects are located in 
remote areas and thus are costly to monitor, as well as when the outcomes of a project are 
difficult to quantify and evaluate.  As with the concept of adverse selection this study is the first 
to examine issues of moral hazard in the funding of local development projects.  Earlier scholars 
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have however examined moral hazard in the distribution of venture capital (Bergemann & 
Hege, 1998; Wang & Zhou, 2004) and microfinance (Navajas et al, 2003; Simtowe et al, 2006), 
as well as the allocation of international aid to third-world governments (Goldsmith, 2001; 
Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Amegashie et al, 2007). 
 
3.3. Agency Theory and the Optimal Contract 
The purpose of agency theory is to determine the optimal contract between a principal and an 
agent given the assumptions of risk aversion, goal conflict and information asymmetry (Baker, 
1992; Allen & Weck, 1995; Wright et al, 2001).  This contract will align compensation to either 
the agent’s behaviour or the outcomes of their actions (Eisenhardt, 1989).  In behaviour-based 
contracts the principal invests in information systems that allow them to monitor the agent’s 
actions and ensure that they align to their own preferences (Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989; Bergen et 
al, 1992). These information systems vary according to the circumstances of the relationship 
and include reporting procedures, budgeting systems, and additional management (Amershi & 
Hughes, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
The second type of contract available to the principal provides remuneration to the agent 
according to the realised outcomes of their actions (Holstrom, 1979; Grossman & Hart, 1983; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). These outcome-based contracts are designed to motivate the agent to act 
according to the preferences of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). This motivation is achieved 
through incentive compatibility which occurs when risk is transferred from the principal to the 
agent in order to align the objectives of the two parties (Hurwicz, 1972; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Bergen et al, 1992).  The use of outcome-based contracts is common among sale personnel and 
product manufacturers (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
The challenge for the principal is therefore to determine which type of contract is most 
efficient, behaviour-based or outcome-based (Grossman & Hart, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989).  This 
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decision depends largely on the trade-off between the cost of monitoring the agent’s actions 
and the cost of transferring risk (Grossman & Hart, 1983; Prendergast, 1999, 2002). It is also 
influenced by several other variables which Eisenhardt (1989) describes as extensions of the 
principal-agent model. These variables and their impact on the relative efficiency of behaviour 
and outcome-based contracts are presented in Table 1.   
 
Table 1: Variables influencing the relative efficiency of behaviour-based and outcome-based contracts 
 Behaviour-based contracts are more 
efficient when: 
Outcome-based contracts are more 
efficient when: 
Monitoring Ability High Low 
Information Systems Affordable Expensive 
Task Programmability  High Low 
Length of Relationship  Long Short 
Goal Compatibility  High Low 
Outcome Uncertainty High Low 
Outcome Measurability Low High 
Source: Adapted from Lassar and Kerr (1996) and Eisenhardt (1989) 
 
The information in Table 1 illustrates the positive relationship between behaviour-based 
contracts and the principal’s ability to monitor the agent’s actions. Thus, behaviour-based 
contracts are more efficient when monitoring systems are affordable (Eisenhardt, 1989); the 
agent’s tasks can be specified or programmed in advance (Eisenhardt, 1985, 1988, 1989; Vlaar, 
2008); and the principal and agent are engaged in a long-term relationship (Lambert, 1983; 
Eisenhardt, 1989).  Behaviour-based contracts are also preferred when the principal and the 
agent share similar goals (Eisenhardt, 1989). This scenario is common in highly socialised or 
family firms (Ouchi, 1979; Gomez-Mejia et al, 2011) and developmental or humanitarian 
interventions (Perrow, 1986). 
 
The relative efficiency of the two contracts is also influenced by outcome uncertainty and 
measurability (Dess & Beard, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989).  As indicated in Table 1 the efficiency of 
outcome-based contracts is greater when outcome uncertainty is low and measurability is high 
 
42 | P a g e  
 
 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Lassar & Kerr, 1996). In other words outcome-based contracts are most 
attractive when there is limited impact from exogenous factors, such as public policy and 
economic climate, and the outcomes can be readily measured or quantified (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Bergen et al, 1992). Contrarily, behaviour-based contracts are efficient when outcomes are 
difficult to observe and quantify (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
The decision whether to engage in behaviour or outcome based contracts therefore depends 
on the characteristics of the principal and the agent, the type of activity involved in the 
contract, and the degree of environmental uncertainty (Eisenhardt, 1989; Bergen et al, 1992; 
Lassar & Kerr, 1996). This system of evaluation provides important insight into the 
appropriateness of funding arrangements and monitoring processes in the current study.  Thus, 
it will be utilised in later chapters as a tool for assessing the effectiveness of co-funding 
contracts and providing recommendations for improved grant funding.   
 
3.4 Applications of Agency Theory  
Agency theory is widely applicable in situations where one party provides financial incentive to 
another to carry out some task.  It has been used by scholars in a range of disciplines including 
economics, accounting, marketing, finance, and political-science (Eisenhardt, 1989; Kiser, 
1999).  The theory is most frequently applied in studies of organisational behaviour including 
phenomena such as acquisitions and takeovers (Amihud & Levi, 1981; Walking & Long, 2011), 
compensation (Eisenhardt, 1988; Parks & Conlon, 1995; Stroketal, 1996), ownership 
arrangements (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Crutchley & Hansen, 1989; Li, 1994; Ang et al, 2000), 
vertical integration (Anderson, 1985; Carney & Gedajlovic, 2006), and innovation (Holstrom, 
1989; Jones & Butler, 1992; J. Francis & A. Smith, 1995).   
 
The use of agency theory in the current study is related to earlier research on project financing 
and the relationship between the financier and the implementing partner.  Specific applications 
have included public-private financing (John & John, 1991; Farrel, 2003; Lyonet du Moutier, 
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2010), European Union member country funding, (Martin, 2006), and the allocation of venture 
capital (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2001; Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003).  Agency theory was also 
recently extended to address issues of funding efficiency in the developing world.  More 
specifically these studies look at the privatisation of local government services (Brown et al, 
2006; Amagoh, 2009), micro-credit arrangements (Armendariz & Morduch, 2005; Obayumi, 
2011), and NGO funding (Peterson, 2010).   
 
Previous applications of agency theory provide an important theoretical foundation for the 
current study.  Firstly, this research establishes agency theory as an appropriate lens through 
which to examine project finance (John & John, 1991; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2001; Arthurs & 
Busenitz, 2003; Farrel, 2003; Gutner, 2005; Martin, 2006; Lyonet du Moutier, 2010).  Secondly, 
it justifies considering development finance distribution in terms of the principal-agent 
relationship (Armendariz & Morduch, 2005; Peterson, 2010; Obayumi, 2011).  Finally, these 
previous studies put forth the argument that co-funding is an effective but not sufficient 
mechanism for sharing risk in situations of asymmetric information (Arping et al, 2009; De Rus 
& Socorro, 2009; Michela & Florio, 2009; Socorro, 2009). The current study seeks to build on 
this foundation by using agency theory to assess the impact of co-funding requirements on the 
success of grant funded LED projects.   
 
3.5. Agency Theory Critiques 
The development and widespread application of agency theory has drawn significant criticism 
for its arguably unrealistic assumptions about human behaviour (Banfield, 1975; Mitnick, 1992; 
Shapiro, 2005; Hartman, 2008a, 2008b).  In his pointed critique Perrow (1986) decries the 
theory as trivial, dehumanising and even dangerous.  The rationale for this criticism is that 
agency theory dismisses morals, ethics and altruism and instead assumes that the agent is 
concerned exclusively with their own profit maximisation (Perrow, 1986; Brennan, 1994; Heath, 
2009).  Several critics even go so far as to argue that agency theory is self-fulfilling such that 
institutional acceptance and the teaching of its principles exacerbate the level of self-interested 
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behaviour (Perrow, 1986; Mitroff, 2004; Ghoshal, 2005; Heath, 2009). The standard response to 
this criticism is to argue that problems arise in a principal-agent relationship not because the 
two parties are entirely self-interested but because their preferences differ (Gauthier, 1986; 
Dees, 1992; Heath, 2009).  It is also not necessary that goal conflict be absolute but instead it 
can exist in varying degrees creating what Waterman and Meier (1998, p.176) call a “dynamic 
process of interaction”.  This defence of agency theory is particularly relevant to the current 
study where it is assumed that the goals of the grant beneficiaries are shaped by both self-
interest and altruism. Thus, the alignment of these goals to those of Gijima KZN varies 
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CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the methodology used in the current study.  This 
methodology is designed according to the grounded theory method of research which guided 
the identification, collection and analysis of data.  The research was conducted in two distinct 
phases and involved both primary and secondary information.   
 
4.1 Grounded Theory Methods 
The current study was conducted using the grounded theory method which is defined by its 
founders as the “discovery of theory from data” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p.1).  The grounded 
theory method differs from other qualitative approaches in that the theory is not proven or 
disproven by the data but instead is derived from it (Strauss & Corbin, 2007).  Thus it requires a 
significant amount of preliminary research through which the research questions are identified 
(Charmaz, 2003). The benefit of using the grounded theory method is that it allows for the 
development of a theory that is both descriptive and explanatory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Glaser, 2002).  
 
The grounded theory method is most commonly employed in health care related studies but 
has also been used sporadically in economic research. The earliest examples are Andrews 
(1949, 1964) investigation into competitive oligopoly and Cyert and March’s (1992) study of 
behavioural decision making in large firms.  More recently Lee (1998) used grounded theory 
methods in his research on post-Keynesian pricing and Sutton (1998) in his examination of 
research and development, market structure and concentration. Finally, both grounded 
methods and the agency theory framework were applied to Reid’s (1996, 1998) analysis of 
venture capital funding for small business. 
 
The grounded theory method was deemed appropriate for the current study for several 
reasons. First, it is a qualitative method that is also compatible with quantitative research 
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(Baker et al, 1992). This allows for the inclusion of data from in-depth interviews as well as 
project documents and figures.  Second, the problem statement for this study was arrived upon 
through analysis of preliminary research which is a process central to the grounded theory 
method (Charmaz, 2003).  Finally, the grounded theory method uses theoretical sampling which 
allows the sample size and sources of data to be continuously expanded until no new 
revelations appear likely (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  This sampling method was compatible with 
the current study as information was continuously made available and the sample size 
expanded to remove bias.    
 
4.2 Preliminary Research 
The research for the current study was conducted in two distinct phases. The first phase 
involved preliminary research which occurred during the scholar’s participation in a socio-
economic impact assessment of the Gijima KZN LCFI programme. This assessment was 
undertaken by a team of academics and researchers from the UKZN School of Development 
Studies (SODS) and began in September 2010. The objective was to quantify the tangible 
economic impact of the LCFI programme, evaluate the appropriateness and efficiency of the 
funding approach, and identify lessons that can be learned from the process (KZN DEDT, 2010).   
 
The LCFI impact assessment included a review of LED literature and programme documents. 
This provided an understanding of LED in South Africa and a confirmation of the programme 
objectives and how they were pursued. The assessment also focused on comparative case 
studies of 14 funded and 14 unfunded projects from which 8 completed projects were selected 
for in-depth analysis. This research involved interviews with project managers, co-funding and 
implementation partners, and beneficiaries. The researcher was involved in each of these 
processes as well as data analysis and the compilation of the final report which was submitted 
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in May 2011.3 In keeping with grounded theory methods this early review provided background 
to the current study but did not directly influence the findings (Strauss, 1987; Dey, 1999).   
 
Participation in the LCFI impact assessment provided the researcher with an opportunity to 
thoroughly examine the programme and identify aspects that warranted further investigation.  
It was through this process that the correlation between co-funding arrangements and project 
outcomes was observed. Following this, the continued analysis of documentation and 
interviews revealed that project ownership, risk sharing, sustainability, onerous reporting 
requirements and partnership development were also key themes. This process of identifying 
categories and classifying information is central to the grounded theory method (Glaser, 1965, 
1992; Strauss & Corbin, 1997).  In the current study it allowed for the formation of research 
questions and provided the framework for continued investigation. 
 
4.3 Primary Research  
The primary research phase was conducted over a four month period following completion of 
the LCFI impact assessment.  This research focused on examining the importance of co-funding 
in the LCFI programme and the relationship between the source of co-funding and project 
outcomes.  It included data collection from programme and project documents; interviews with 
numerous stakeholders; and the review of transcripts from earlier research.  As with the 
preliminary phase the primary research also employed grounded theory methods including 
theoretical sampling and the simultaneous collection and analysis of data (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990; Charmaz, 2003).     
 
The review of programme and project documents included all 183 funding applications, project 
evaluations from each of the five calls for proposals, as well as interim and close-out reports 
                                                     
3 Interested parties should refer to the LCFI Impact Assessment Report (2011), available from the KZN DEDT, for 
further information on the programme.   
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from all 25 completed projects.4 The focus of this investigation was to determine the 
relationship between co-funding arrangements and the projects outcomes. This information 
also informed questions asked during personal and phone interviews conducted with the 
managers of all 25 completed projects5, as well as various service providers, co-funders and 
implementing partners.6  The decision whether or not to interview additional stakeholders and 
to visit the project site was based on the nature of the project, measurability of the outcomes, 
and identified need for clarification.    
 
The primary research phase also included semi-structured interviews with individuals directly 
and indirectly involved with the LCFI Programme.7 This included the Gijima KZN programme 
manager, heads of the programme coordinating and financial contracting units, and several 
area managers, as well as LCFI funding forum members from ABSA, Nedbank and the DBSA.  
Information was also gathered from the transcripts of 19 ‘expert’ interviews conducted during 
the LCFI impact assessment.8  Finally, an external opinion on LED grant funding was provided by 
an executive manager of the Business Trust Shared Growth Challenge Fund which provides co-
funded grants to pro-poor LED projects throughout South Africa. The information gathered in 
these interviews was used to determine the intended role of co-funding in the LCFI programme; 
perceptions regarding its impact on the project outcomes; and expert opinion on co-funding as 
a risk sharing mechanism.  
 
4.4. Data Analysis 
The data analysis occurred over several months and involved the careful comparison and 
evaluation of information from all sources according to the grounded theory method.  This 
allowed for a holistic examination of co-funding using informed feedback from stakeholders as 
                                                     
4 Refer to Appendix A for a brief description of each completed project. 
5 A project was classified as completed if the grant beneficiary had received and spent the bulk of their allocated 
LCFI funding and submitted a close-out report to Gijima KZN.   
6 Refer to Appendix B for a list of project related interviews.   
7 The researcher conducted a total of 50 interviews with project and programme stakeholders, including 15 during 
preliminary research.7 
8 Refer to Appendix C for a list of all expert interviews. 
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well as the comparison of completed projects.  The completed projects were divided into 3 
categories depending on the source of their co-funding. These categories and the number of 
projects in each are: 
1. Internally Co-funded (14 projects): Co-funding was provided by the LCFI grant recipient 
through some form of own-contribution.  This includes money from savings as well as 
bank loans.  
2. Externally Co-funded (5 projects): Co-funding was provided by additional grants or 
donations including funding from NGOs, development agencies, and private donations.    
3. Government Co-funded (6 projects): Co-funding was provided by the relevant local 
government or a government department.  This co-funding was offered as a grant with 
no obligations for repayment.     
 
The projects in each category were evaluated in order to determine the relationship between 
co-funding arrangements and project outcomes.  This evaluation was conducted according to 
the LCFI evaluation criteria provided in the Operational Manual for Grant Schemes (DEDT & EC, 
2004)9.  This manual was a joint product of the KZN DEDT and the European Commission and 
included the following eight indicators:   
1. Employment creation and poverty alleviation. 
2. Closing the gap between the first and second economy.10 
3. Development of economic infrastructure. 
4. Skills development that meets local economic demands. 
5. Achieving the priorities of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE).11 
6. Impact on the local economy. 
7. Extent of private sector support and financing. 
8. Economic and financial sustainability of project benefits.  
                                                     
9 The Operations Manual for Grant Schemes based the LCFI evaluation criteria on the guidelines for prioritising 
interventions provided in the KZN Provincial Growth and Development Strategy (2004-2014). 
10 Aliber, Kirsten, and Maharajh (2006) define the first economy as a “globally integrated world of production, 
exchange and consumption” and the second economy as a “constrained world of informality, poverty, and 
marginalisation”.       
11 The concept of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is defined in the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act (2003) as the “meaningful participation of black people in the economy” (RSA, 2003).  
 




The 25 completed LCFI projects were given a score of 1 to 5 for each of the above criteria.  This 
scoring system is based on the European Commission’s standard evaluation grid provided in 
Table 2. This grid is used in all programme funded by the European Commission including the 
Gijima KZN LCFI (DEDT & EC, 2004; EU, 2012).   
 








The project evaluations combined the quantitative results from project documentation and 
evaluations with the qualitative responses from project and programme stakeholders. The 
benefits of integrating the two approaches are discussed in Bamberger (2000) and include the 
incorporation of different perspectives and methods; the opportunity to acquire feedback and 
assist with the interpretation of findings; and greater consistency in the research conclusions.  
The remainder of this study uses the outcomes of this analysis to extract and discuss research 
findings and develop conclusions and recommendations regarding co-funding and grant 
finance.  
  
4.5 Strength’s and Limitations 
The methodology used in the current study has several key strengths and limitations. The 
greatest strength is that it allowed for continuous data collection over nine months facilitated 
by the researcher’s role in the LCFI Impact Assessment and the grounded theory method.  This 
Score Meaning 




5 Very Good 
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enabled the researcher to gain extensive knowledge of the projects involved. It also allowed for 
more accurate measures of sustainability as the preliminary research was conducted during the 
final stages of implementation while the primary research occurred after the exhaustion of 
grant funding.   
A second important strength of the methodology is derived from the breadth of the LCFI 
programme which financed a range of public, private and civil society initiatives.  This allowed 
for comparative analysis across several variables within a single programme. The range of 
projects also however provided several challenges in terms of comparing outcomes between 
projects with very different objectives, levels of funding, and implementation timeframes.  This 
issue is also highlighted in other evaluation studies which recommend that project success be 
considered on an individual basis (Turok & Wannop, 1990; Foley, 1992).   
Additional limitations in the research methodology include the inaccuracy found in many 
project interim and close-out reports, especially relating to revenue, sustainability and job 
creation outcomes. These inaccuracies were unearthed during interviews with project 
managers, employees and beneficiaries, and are a result of the desire to placate Gijima KZN 
administrators. Although in some cases the discussion of these inaccuracies enhanced the study 
it is possible that several respondents remained dishonest about their projects resulting in a 
potential bias towards successful implementation and sustainability.  
 
The different level of knowledge gained about some projects over others also posed a specific 
constraint in terms of producing unbiased and informed results. This limitation is a 
consequence of the researcher’s participation in the LCFI impact assessment where only some 
projects were visited and interrogated.  Attempts were made to remedy this by conducting site-
visits with the additional projects during the principal research phase however due to 
geographical distance and financial limitations it was not possible to visit every completed 
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the research findings from the comparative analysis of 
completed projects.  As discussed in the methodology these projects were divided into three 
co-funding categories and compared according to their achievement of LCFI outcomes.  The 
scores for each individual project as well as the average scores for each category and group of 
projects co-funding group are presented in Table 3 and discussed in the following chapter.  
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1) Illovo Sugar Umzimkulu 4 5 1 1 3 2 4 3 23 
2) Umlalazi Small Cane Growers 4 5 1 3 3 2 4 3 25 
3) Darnall Sugar Cane 4 5 1 1 3 2 4 3 23 
4) Noodsberg Cane Growers 4 5 1 3 3 2 4 3 25 
5) Illovo Sugar Sizele Mill 4 5 1 1 3 2 4 3 23 
6) Kwakhoza Cane Project  4 5 1 3 3 2 4 4 26 
7) Isinembe Cane Growers 4 5 1 3 3 2 4 4 26 
8) Wilderness Safaris Dive Camp 5 4 5 2 4 4 5 5 34 
9) BlueBrand Beef Eshowe Abattoir 5 2 5 3 4 4 5 5 33 
10) Stables Wine Estate 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 11 
11) Crosswind Maize Mill 4 4 4 2 4 3 4 4 29 
12) Corrida Shoes Thread of Hope 5 2 2 4 3 4 4 5 29 
13) Africa Media Online 3 2 1 3 1 2 4 4 20 
14) Superior Vegetables Farming  3 4 4 3 5 3 4 4 30 
Average 3.9 3.9 2.1 2.4 3.1 2.5 4.1 3.6 25.5 
External Co-Funding 
15) Eshowe Craft Support Agency 3 5 1 5 3 3 1 4 25 
16) Hlabisa Sugarcane Project 1 3 1 1 3 2 1 2 14 
17) Muthi Futhi 3 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 15 
18) Project Preparation Trust 3 5 1 5 4 5 1 4 28 
19) Gateway Tourism Initiative 3 2 4 3 2 3 1 4 22 
20) Zikulise Support & Training Centre 3 5 4 5 4 4 3 4 32 
Average 2.2 3.7 2.0 3.5 3.0 3.2 1.3 3.3 22.7 
Government Co-Funding 
21) Ugu Fresh Produce Market Packhouse 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 13 
22) KwaXolo Chicken Abattoir 2 3 4 5 3 3 3 3 26 
23) Aloe and Berg Tea 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 12 
24) Nkandla Essential Oils 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 14 
25) Sisonke Express 1 2 5 2 2 3 4 4 23 
Average 1.4 2.0 3.0 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.0 2.6 17.6 
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The internal co-funding group achieved the highest average score in terms of LED outcomes 
and sustainability with an average of 25.5 out of a possible 40.  The two top scoring projects in 
the LCFI programme also belong to this group, namely the Wilderness Safaris Dive Camp and 
the BlueBrand Beef Eshowe Abattoir which scored 34 and 33 respectively.  Finally, the internal 
co-funding group also included the only project planned and implemented by a Previously 
Disadvantaged Individual (PDI), namely Superior Vegetables Farming.  This project was one of 
the best performers in the programme according to the above mentioned indicators scoring a 
total of 30 points.  
 
The external co-funding group achieved the second highest average score with 22.7 out of a 
possible 40.  Notably, the scores within this co-funding group varied considerably with the skills 
based initiatives achieving significantly better outcomes than the projects pursuing enterprise 
development.  The government co-funding group registered the poorest results in terms of LED 
outcomes and sustainability scoring an average of only 17.6 out of a possible 40.  This group 
also included three of the LCFI programmes worst performers, namely Aloe and Berg Tea, 
Nkandla Essential Oils, and the Ugu Fresh Produce Packhouse.      
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the evaluation of LCFI project outcomes and the 
relationship between these outcomes and co-funding arrangements. This discussion draws on 
primary and secondary data including interviews and project reports.  Information is also 
incorporated from interviews with Gijima KZN staff, external experts, and applicants from 
cancelled projects.  This discussion will inform conclusions and recommendations regarding the 
effectiveness of co-funding in LED grant programmes. 
 
6.1. Employment Creation and Poverty Alleviation 
The EU and Gijima KZN set employment and poverty alleviation targets for the LCFI programme.  
These targets included the “generation/preservation of 3000 permanent jobs”12 and a 
“reduction of the number of households earning less than R800”13 (EPRD, 2004; DEDT, 2006).  
However, the current study found that following exhaustion of the grant only 548 permanent 
jobs remained. This reiterates the Gijima KZN programme manager’s argument that “the 
employment targets for these types of programmes are unrealistically high” (R. Persad, 2011, 
pers. comm.).  The achievements in terms of poverty alleviation were however greater with 
approximately 85% of new jobs involving previously unemployed and disadvantaged people.  
Additionally, the 25 completed LCFI projects created income for between 1,600 and 2,000 poor 
households.  The following discussion categorises these results according to co-funding type 
and compares the relationship between co-funding arrangements and employment and 
poverty outcomes.  
 
                                                     
12 The LCFI employment target was set in 2004 based on the assumption that there would be “no significant 
downturn in the national or provincial macroeconomic situation” (EPRD, 2004).  This of course was incorrect with 
many projects negatively impacted by the global economic recession which began in 2008.   
13 Gijima KZN did not pursue a specific household income target due to a lack of baseline data.  However, the 
programme remained committed to income generation.  
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The impact of LCFI projects on employment 
creation and poverty alleviation is illustrated 
in Figure 1.  More specifically, it shows the 
average number of jobs created and 
preserved as well as the average number of 
poor households receiving income in each co-
funding category.  This information was used 
to generate a score out of 5 for each 
completed project.  The internal co-funding 
group achieved the highest average score 
with 3.9 followed by relatively low scores 
among the external and government co-
funded groups of 2.2 and 1.4 respectively.  
 
The internal co-funding group created an average of 27 jobs, preserved an average 12 jobs, and 
generated income for an average of 103 households per project (as illustrated in Figure 1).  The 
relatively high number of jobs created and preserved by these projects is attributed to the 
desire of private sector partners for sustained business growth which is arguably strengthened 
when internal funds are committed to the project.  The large number of households receiving 
income is due not only to this employment creation but also the incorporation of small-scale 
farmers in the cane and maize milling projects.  Thus, privately managed projects in the 
agriculture and agro-processing industries appear to have a large pro-poor impact.  
 
The externally co-funded projects generated significantly fewer jobs, averaging only 3.2 
permanent jobs per project.14  This is not however a clear indictment of their success as three 
of these projects focused on capacity building and one on infrastructure development, citing 
job creation as only an indirect pursuit.  These projects also achieved much more in terms of 
income generation, especially the Eshowe Craft Support Agency, Project Preparation Trust, and 
                                                     
14 Note that jobs are only considered permanent if they extend beyond the exhaustion of grant funding.  


















Source: Interviews with Project Managers (April, 2011) 
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the Zikulise Support and Training Centre. Their focus on capacitating crafters and entrepreneurs 
resulted in income generation for nearly 200 rural households following implementation with 
the potential for significantly greater impact in the long-term.  
 
The LCFI programme also included numerous projects which failed to have an impact on 
employment and incomes despite this being a primary objective. This includes the two business 
oriented projects in the external co-funding group and 5 of the 6 projects in the government co-
funded group.  The experts from Gijima KZN contribute this to their “failure to adequately 
prepare” (M. Sibeko, 2011, pers. comm), the “complete lack of experience among project 
managers” (J. Mitchell, 2011, pers. comm.), and the “supply-side approach taken by many 
projects” (R. Persad, 2011, pers. comm.).  Research conducted for the current study confirms 
this prognosis but also reveals that these issues can be traced back to a lack of private sector 
involvement.  The inclusion of a private sector partner increases the likelihood that projects are 
market oriented, carefully planned, and sustainably profitable.  
  
6.2. Closing the Gap between the First and Second Economy 
The Gijima KZN programme was designed in 2004 and thus aligned to President Thabo Mbeki’s 
emphasis on “linking the first and second economy” (G. McDonald, 2011, pers. comm.).  This 
objective is defined in the Gijima KZN Implementation Framework as the “incorporation of 
small-scale producers into the modern economy” (DEDT, 2006).  The current study revealed 
that the internal and external co-funding groups achieved relative success in this regard, scoring 
an average of 3.9 and 3.7 respectively, while outcomes for the government co-funded projects 
were generally ‘poor’ averaging only 2.0 out of a possible 5. 
 
The projects that achieved the greatest success in terms of closing the gap between these two 
economies were those involved in farming, craft production and SMME development.  For 
example, the internally funded sugar cane projects incorporated a total of 785 previously 
 
58 | P a g e  
 
 
disadvantaged growers into their supply chain;15 Crosswind Mills increased the number of 
small-scale maize suppliers from 195 to 207; and Superior Vegetables provided full-time 
employment to three previously subsistence farmers.  In addition, the formalisation of 147 craft 
producers through co-operative development and training was achieved by the externally co-
funded Eshowe Craft Support Agency.  Finally, the Zikulise Support and Training Centre and 
Project Preparation Trust assisted over 100 entrepreneurs with training, business plan 
development and entrepreneurial support (M. Misselhorn, 2011, pers. comm.).  
 
The government co-funded projects were the least successful in terms of economic integration, 
despite their focus on small and marginalised producers. This is attributed to the reliance of 
these projects on outside consultants with little knowledge of the local economy.  Put another 
way, government co-funded projects attempted to link the first and second economy by 
promoting business opportunities regardless of local skills and market demand. This is in 
contrast to the internally co-funded projects which incorporated small-scale producers into an 
established supply-chain. The lack of viability among government co-funded projects is 
unsurprising given their apparent inability to attract private investors.   
 
6.3. Development of Economic Infrastructure  
The Gijima KZN LCFI programme sought to develop a “base of infrastructure and services to 
provide a platform for increased competitiveness” (Patterson, 2008).  Thus, the development of 
economic infrastructure is included as an indicator of project success. The current evaluation 
considered not only the quantity of infrastructure but also its economic practicality and the 
potential for long-term impact on the area. This evaluation revealed that government co-
funded projects achieved the greatest success in terms of economic infrastructure scoring an 
                                                     
15 The cane projects were implemented by Illovo Sugar and Tongaat Hulett (using internal co-funding) as well as the 
Ingwe Development Co-Operative (using external co-funding).  Although all eight projects were successful the 
Ingwe Development Co-Operative suffered the greatest challenges in terms of implementation (M. Sibeko, 2011, 
pers. comm.). 
 
59 | P a g e  
 
 
average 3.0 out of 5, compared to only 2.1 and 2.0 for the internally and externally co-funded 
groups respectively. 
 
The development of economic infrastructure is part of the municipal government mandate and 
therefore was the focus of government co-funded projects (COGTA, 2009). This included the 
Ingwe Municipalities Sisonke Express, the Ugu Municipalities Fresh Produce Packhouse, and the 
Hibiscus Coast Municipalities KwaXolo Chicken Abattoir. These projects were however faced 
with a myriad of challenges relating to infrastructure maintenance, weak demand, and a lack of 
competitiveness.16 To overcome these challenges the municipalities sought private sector 
partners which would manage the project and absorb some financial risk.  This approach was 
acknowledged in interviews with the three Municipal LED Managers as “necessary” (M. 
Macebe, 2011, pers. comm.), “essential” (S. Hlongwane, 2011, pers. comm.) and “absolutely 
crucial” for sustainable operations (D. Smith, 2011, pers. comm.).   
 
The development of economic infrastructure was also the focus of several internally co-funded 
projects, namely the Wilderness Safaris Dive Camp, the Blue Brand Beef Feedlot, and the 
Crosswind Maize Mill.  Interestingly, these projects achieved the highest overall score in terms 
of LED outcomes illustrating the important role of capital investment.  Their success also 
reiterates the private sectors ability to direct investment towards viable projects and ensure 
that their implementation occurs in an effective and sustainable manner.  This may be related 
to the risk assumed when private businesses invest their own resources into a project.  
 
6.4. Skills Development that Meets Local Economic Demand 
The shortage of skills in South Africa is universally recognised as a constraint to local economic 
and SMME development. In reference to the LCFI programme the president of the 
Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce in KZN emphasised this issue claiming that “enterprise 
                                                     
16 The Sisonke Express was non-operational for several months due to prolonged track repairs; the Ugu Fresh 
Produce Packhouse did not address the demands of local farmers; and the KwaXolo Chicken Abattoir struggled to 
compete with larger manufacturers.  
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development is not an appropriate solution for tackling unemployment so long as people 
remain unemployable” (A. Layman, 2011, pers. comm.).  Thus, skills development was included 
as a key priority of the LCFI programme and resulted in the training of approximately 2,700 
people in both job specific and business management skills.   
 
The average number of people trained by 
projects in each co-funding group and the type 
of training provided is illustrated in Figure 2.  As 
shown, the external co-funding group placed the 
greatest emphasis on skills development training 
an average of 350 people per project.  This was 
followed by the government co-funded group 
and the internal co-funded group which trained 
an average of 30 people and 26 people per 
project respectively. These projects were also 
scored individually for their commitment to skills 
development. The external co-funded group 
scored a very high average of 3.5 out of 5, with 
2.4 for the internal co-funded group and 2.2 for 
the government co-funded group. The government co-funded projects scored lower on average 
than those co-funded internally because, although a similar number of individuals were trained 
by both groups, almost all training in the government co-funded category was conducted by a 
single project.   
 
The government and internally co-funded projects focus largely on enterprise development 
with training occurring almost exclusively among new employees.  There is however three main 
exceptions in these two groups. The first exception is the government co-funded KwaXolo 


















Figure 2: Skills development  
Source: LCFI Project Close-Out Reports (2007-2010)   
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training in chicken production to 120 small-scale farmers.17  This training involved individual 
female producers and women’s co-operatives and occurred for two weeks a month over the 
course of one year (R. Van Vuuren, 2011, pers. comm.).  Interviews were conducted with two 
beneficiaries of this training who confirmed that the exercise was “very helpful” (B. Maundla, 
2011, pers. comm.) and “gave them more say in their home” (Z. Cele, 2011, pers. comm.) by 
ensuring that it was not only their husbands earning an income. 
 
There were also several projects in the internally co-funded group that provided more than the 
average level of training. This includes the 4 sugar cane projects managed by the Lima Rural 
Development Agency.  This agency provided training to co-operatives in financial and business 
management (P. Greene, 2011, pers. comm.), thus ensuring the long-term sustainability of 
small-grower farming. The emphasis placed on training by Lima Rural Development and 
Scientific Roets illustrates the benefits that can accrue from involving qualified consultants in 
project implementation. The final exception in terms of skills development was the internally 
co-funded and managed Corrida Shoes Thread of Hope project.  This project invested business 
revenue into a rural training centre that provides sewing classes and will eventually offer small 
business support to components manufacturer (B. Reynolds, 2011, pers. comm.). This emphasis 
on skills development is credited by an informed LED expert as the “reason for the project’s 
success” (V. Ngcobo, 2010, pers. comm.)    
 
The external co-funding group was however the only category of projects to place a large 
emphasis on skills development. The six projects in this group provided training to 
approximately 2,100 previously disadvantaged individuals. This training was concentrated 
however within three skills-based projects, namely the Eshowe Craft Support Agency, the 
Project Preparation Trust, and the Zikulise Support and Training Centre. These projects 
emphasised both employability as well as the development of business skills including planning, 
                                                     
17 Notably the training and stipend provided to small-scale poultry farmers was financed entirely by the Agricultural 
Sector Education and Training Authority (SETA) prior to construction of the KwaXolo Chicken Abattoir and 
therefore was not directly related to the LCFI grant.  
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marketing, accounting, and management. Their relative success illustrates the important 
contribution of non-profit groups to local economic and SMME development.   
 
The three skills-based projects also raise questions about the wisdom of placing co-funding 
requirements on non-profit ventures.  These requirements accomplish very little in terms of risk 
transfer, as there are no financial rewards from the project.  They also create complications in 
terms of aligning the objectives and timelines of funding institutions as well as increasing the 
amount of time and effort required to attract resources.  These concerns were raised by the 
managers of all three skills based projects (D. Hay, 2011, pers. comm.; M. Misselhorn, 2011, 
pers. comm.; J. Johnson, 2011, pers. comm.). Alternatively however the manager of the Eshowe 
Craft Support Agency also conceded that co-funding provides smaller donors with greater 
recognition for less financial commitment, therefore increasing the total amount of funding 
some projects are able to attract (D. Hay, 2011, pers. comm.).       
 
6.5. Achieving the Principles of Black Economic Empowerment 
The principles of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)18 are summarised in South African 
legislation as the “meaningful participation of black people in the economy” and include 
ownership, management, skills development, and employment equity (RSA, 2003). The current 
study scored the BEE outcomes of all completed projects according to each of these indicators.  
This process revealed that the greatest BEE achievements occurred in the internal co-funding 
group, which scored an average of 3.1 out of five, followed by the 3.0 for the external co-
funding group and 2.0 for the government co-funding group. The following is a discussion of 
these achievements and whether they are impacted by co-funding arrangements.    
 
                                                     
1818 The Gijima KZN programme did not consider BEE criteria in their project selection, due to EU regulations 
regarding racial preferences (R. Persad, 2011, pers. comm.). They did however consider BEE achievements as an 
indicator of project success in keeping with government policy and legislation.   
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The external co-funding group scored relatively well in terms of BEE achievements due to the 
commitment of three projects to skills and capacity development.19  However, their overall 
failure to address business transformation resulted in weak outcomes in terms of ownership, 
management, and employment equity. The only exception was the Enzanghako Consultancy 
which partnered with a local co-operative in the growing and processing of medicinal herbs.  
The BEE impact of this partnership was diminished however by the “terrible relations and 
complete mistrust between them [the project manager] and the co-operative” (G. Banda, 2011, 
pers. comm.). Inversely, projects in the government co-funded group placed significant 
emphasis on black business ownership and management, especially by community groups.  
They failed however to sustainably implement these projects resulting in the realisation of few 
BEE outcomes.    
 
The projects implemented using internal co-funding achieved the most notable BEE impact.  
This is a result of the commitment made by many businesses to involve previously 
disadvantaged individual’s (PDIs), communities, and workers in project implementation and 
revenue sharing.  For instance the Wilderness Safaris Dive Camp was constructed using locally 
manufactured inputs and labour, created employment for 46 PDIs, and transferred ownership 
to a BEE partner (10%) and community trust (17.5%) (C. Poultney, 2011, pers. comm.).  a 
second example is the Bluebrand Beef Feedlot which created 55 jobs at their LCFI funded 
abattoir and 25 additional jobs at their previously idle deboning plant for PDIs, including 
management positions (J. Schnettler, 2011, pers. comm.).  Finally, Crosswind Mills employed 25 
PDIs, incorporated 12 previously subsistence farmers into their supply-chain, and formed a 
workers trust to share in mill ownership (W. Botes, 2011, pers. comm.).   
 
The internal co-funding group also includes the most successful project in terms of BEE 
achievements.  This project, implemented by Superior Vegetables, was the only initiative in the 
LCFI programme managed and staffed entirely by black individuals and youth.  The project was 
                                                     
19 These three projects were the Eshowe Craft Support Agency, the Project Preparation Trust, and the Zikulise 
Support and Training Centre.  
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founded through a strong partnership between the emerging BEE farmer and an established 
grower which facilitated significant knowledge transfer and access to a secure market.  It also 
created employment for four PDIs, each of which was given a stake in the business and thus will 
share in the profits.  Finally, the project was commended by the Gijima KZN Financial Manager 
as “one of the best when it comes to accountability despite doubts that he would have 
problems with financial management” (M. Sibeko, 2011, pers. comm.).   
 
The Superior Vegetables project also provides important insight into the relationship between 
co-funding requirements and BEE. The co-funding for this project was secured through a 
R500,000 loan from Ithala Bank.  Although the terms of this loan require significant monthly 
repayments the project manager concedes that these repayments “push them to work harder” 
as there is “no rush when everything is free” (K. Ntuli, 2011, pers. comm.). The concern 
however is that loans of this type are extraordinarily difficult to secure given the high risk 
environment.  This concern is validated by the Ithala loan manager for the Superior Vegetables 
project who admitted that the loan was only approved because she “was new to development 
finance and not yet jaded” (T. Maqoma, 2011, pers. comm.). The difficulty in securing rural 
loans was also noted in the LCFI Impact Assessment as well as by several Gijima KZN area 
managers who argue that the system “does not work in these areas” (S. Mthimkhulu, 2011, 
pers. comm.) and that “people are unable to provide even 5% of the needed investment” (T. 
Mhlanga, 2011, pers. comm.). Thus, internal co-funding requirements diminish the pool of 
applicants and may limit BEE outcomes.  
 
6.6. Impact on the Local Economy 
The impact of a successful LED project extends beyond its direct outcomes and includes indirect 
benefits such as value-chain development, employment generation, and the creation of an 
enabling economic environment (Blakely & Leigh, 2002).  Thus, the current study evaluated the 
impact of LCFI projects on the local economy according to these indicators.  The results were 
most impressive for the external co-funding group which scored an average 3.2 out of 5 
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compared to an average of only 2.5 for the internal co-funding group and 2.4 for those using 
government funds. The following is an examination of this wider economic impact and whether 
it is related to specific co-funding arrangements.  
 
The internal and government co-funding groups had a relatively weak impact on the local 
economy. This is attributed to several factors including the high number of sugar cane 
projects,20 which accomplished little in terms strengthening local value-chains, creating 
permanent employment, and developing infrastructure.  The limited economic impact is also 
due to the high failure rate among government co-funded projects and the lack of integration 
between successful ventures, such as Sisonke Express, and the local economy.  Finally, the LCFI 
programme required partnership formation between an established and an emerging entity but 
“failed to ensure that these partnerships translated into tangible economic benefits” (R. Clacey, 
2011, pers. comm.).  The conclusion is, however, that there is no discernible link between co-
funding and the projects wider economic impact.       
  
The government co-funded projects achieved much greater local economic impacts through 
their dedication to SMME development. The most successful of these initiatives was 
implemented by Project Preparation Trust (PPT) and resulted in the mentoring of 
approximately 50 entrepreneurs, the establishment of over 1,500 savings and credit groups, 
and partnership formation between a local farming co-operative and an established production 
facility21 (M. Misselhorn, 2011, pers. comm.). The project manager did however express 
negative sentiments regarding co-funding arguing that it led to “difficulties synchronising the 
timeframes of both funding sources” (M. Misselhorn, 2011, pers. comm.). Thus, co-funding 
requirements may have a negative impact on LED outcomes when applied to non-profit groups.  
  
                                                     
20 The internal co-funding group included 7 sugar cane projects (out of 14).   
21 The LCFI grant was used to conduct participatory action planning with the Richmond Pepper Outgrowers 
however funding to secure inputs, prepare land, and provide business support was donated by Angela Mai and co-
funded from the Business Trust Shared Growth Challenge Fund (Bassman, 2010).  
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6.7. Extent of Private Sector Support and Financing 
The Gijima KZN programme was originally designed to “promote private sector investment in 
sustainable development projects that benefit the commercial participants and have wider 
spill-over benefits to the local and regional economy” (T. Farole, personal communication, 10 
November 2010).  Thus, the amount of private sector support and financing leveraged by the 
LCFI grant was considered an important indicator of project success.  This holds specific 
implications for the current study which examines whether private sector, or internal, co-
funding has an impact on project outcomes.  
 
The evaluation of completed LCFI projects revealed, unsurprisingly, that the internal co-funding 
group was highly successful in securing private sector support and financing.  This group scored 
an average of 4.1 out of 5 and leveraged approximately R27.5 million in co-funding.  Within this 
group there is also a positive correlation between the amount of private sector funding 
allocated to a project and its overall success.  For instance, Wilderness Safaris and BlueBrand 
Beef each provided significantly more than the 30% required co-funding22 and achieved notable 
outcomes in terms of employment creation, infrastructure development, and sustainability.  
Thus, it is assumed that private sector support and financing suggests project viability.  
 
The issue therefore is not whether the Wilderness Safaris, BlueBrand Beef, and other privately 
backed projects were viable but rather did they warrant grant funding.  The managers of these 
projects admitted that their initiatives would have been implemented regardless of the LCFI 
grant, albeit over longer timeframes and with fewer pro-poor measures (C. Poultney, personal 
communication, 24 November 2010; J. Schnettler, personal communication, 18 April 2011).  
This contradicts the intention of the LCFI and other LED programmes to incentivise investment 
in “profit based socially conscious initiatives” operating in “high-risk areas or markets” (P. Zille, 
personal communication, 14 April 2011). Thus, it is important that internally co-funded projects 
are assessed for their pro-poor contributions as well as their financial viability.  
                                                     
22 Wilderness Safaris committed R5 532 412 and BlueBrand Beef committed R4 800 000 in private funds amounting 
to 67.4% and 55.8% of their respective project budgets.    
 




The level of private sector support and financing was considerably less among the external and 
government co-funded groups, which implemented their projects without a private sector 
partner.  In the externally co-funded group only one project received private funding in the 
form of corporate social investment.23  This is not overly problematic however, given the 
group’s focus on developing skills rather than business.  Of greater concern is the limited 
private sector investment in the government co-funded group, which scored an average of only 
2.0 out of 5 despite placing emphasis on enterprise development. Interestingly, the two 
projects in this category that achieved the greatest LED impact were also the only two to 
actively recruit private sector partners following implementation.24 Thus, the success of all 
enterprise development projects in the LCFI programme is positively correlated to participation 
and financial commitment by the private sector.  
 
6.8. Economic and Financial Sustainability of Project Benefits 
The Gijima KZN LCFI programme was designed in the wake of earlier failures such as the LED 
Fund which produced only a “number of small, unsustainable projects” (Patterson, 2008).  Thus, 
an emphasis was placed on economic and financial sustainability, in principle if not always in 
practice. The current study evaluated this sustainability based on the endurance and 
advancement of project outcomes six months to one year after implementation.  The results 
varied considerably, both between and within the different co-funding groups, with internally 
co-funded projects scoring an average of 3.6 out of 5, followed by 3.3 for the external co-
funding group and only 2.6 for those using government resources.   
 
The sustainability of internally co-funded projects is attributed in part to the involvement of 
private sector partners.  For instance, well-established businesses such as Wilderness Safaris, 
                                                     
23 The Zikulise Support and Training Centre received R500,000 from the ABSA Foundation and R1,550,000 from 
Exxaro Sands to finance their “support for sustainable enterprise development” (A. Fouche, 2011, pers. comm.) 
24 The Ingwe Municipality recruited Signature Life Hotels to manage and operate the Sisonke Express following 
implementation of the LCFI project.  The Hibiscus Coast Municipality intended to operate the KwaXolo Chicken 
Abattoir in partnership with the community however have since begun recruiting a private sector partner.    
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BlueBrand Beef, and Corrida Shoes implemented highly sustainable projects.25  The Superior 
Vegetables project also achieved sustainability through private partnership which ensured 
affordable land, extensive advice and a secure market (K. Ntuli, 2011, pers. comm.; W. Hewlitt, 
2011, pers. comm.). The single exception is the Stables Wine Estate which was liquidated 
following implementation of the LCFI grant due to unrelated debt (Padayachee, 2012). The 
failure of this project and ultimate collapse of the business illustrates the unavoidable risk of 
project based LED. 
 
The seven internally co-funded sugar cane projects provide further insight into the 
sustainability of private sector initiatives. These projects were co-funded through different 
arrangements including funding by the sugar mill, loan financing by the individual growers, and 
a combination of the two.  Interviews with project managers reveal that sustainability was 
highest when combined co-funding was used as “some financial commitment by the farmer is 
necessary” (E. Bruggemann, 2011, pers. comm.) while on the other hand “repayment of all 
planning costs can leave farmers in permanent debt” (B. Pearce, 2011, pers. comm.). The 
success of these projects was also greater when the individual growers, rather than contractors, 
were involved in planting, managing, and harvesting the crop (P. Greene, 2011, pers. comm.; D. 
Armstrong, 2011, pers. comm.).  Thus, the Kwakhoza and Isinembe Cane Projects achieved the 
highest sustainability scores for their involvement of beneficiaries in implementation and co-
funding without creating a significant debt burden.     
 
The limited sustainability of projects in the government co-funded group also iterates the 
importance of private sector involvement in enterprise LED. This group includes three 
enterprise development projects and two involved in the construction of economic 
infrastructure.26  The consultants employed to manage the three enterprise initiatives argue 
that their sustainability was constrained by “delayed municipal funding” (R. Cairns, 2011, pers. 
comm.); “municipal mismanagement” (R. Van Vuuren, 2011, pers. comm.); and a “mismatch 
                                                     
25 Note however the previously discussed debate about whether these established businesses warrant grant support.  
26 The enterprise development projects are Aloe and Berg Tea, Nkandla Essential Oils, and the KwaXolo Chicken 
Abattoir.  The business infrastructure projects are the Ugu Fresh Produce Market Packhouse and Sisonke Express.    
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between the municipality’s capacity and the skills needed to run the project” (N. Meyer, 2011, 
pers. comm.).  The consensus among the three project managers quoted is that private sector 
involvement is necessary, however one manager raised legitimate concerns that “a private 
partner would not find it economically feasible to come on board and would only invest for 
political or social responsibility reasons” (R. Cairns, 2011 pers. comm.).27  Similarly, of the two 
business infrastructure projects sustainability was achieved only by Sisonke Express through the 
early attraction of a private sector partner.   
 
The sustainability of LCFI outcomes is not however limited to private sector projects.  The 
current study also found outcome sustainability among externally co-funded, non-profit 
ventures.  These outcomes were retained through the training of entrepreneurs and SMMEs 
(Zikulise Support & Training Centre and Project Preparation Trust), the development of co-
operatives (UKZN Eshowe Craft Support Agency) and the improvement of local infrastructure 
(Gateway Tourism Initiative). Sustainability of these non-profit projects is also enhanced 
through the attraction of additional funds from government, international development 
agencies, big business, and local churches.  Interestingly, the only two projects in the external 
co-funding group not to achieve sustainable outcomes were implemented for the purpose of 
business development.28    
 
The preceding discussion highlights the important role of private sector partners and internal 
co-funding in achieving sustainable LED outcomes. This inference is only valid however in 
reference to business ventures, with experienced non-profit groups capable of implementing 
sustainable skills, capacity, and infrastructure development projects. There is also limited 
evidence that these non-profit projects benefit from co-funding requirements, which may in 
                                                     
27 The LCFI Impact Assessment argues that the high level of municipal co-funding illustrates a “degree of risk 
aversion by funding agents in investing heavily in projects or a high degree of uncertainty associated with the 
outcome of the LCFI projects” (SODS, 2011). 
28 The two business development projects in the external co-funding group are Muthi Futhi and the Hlabisa Sugar 
Cane Project however it was reported that Muthi Futhi would become sustainable if provided additional funding (G. 
Banda, 2011, pers. comm.). 
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fact “place significant constraints on implementation” (M. Misselhorn, 2011, pers. comm.).  This 
and other conclusions are compiled and summarised in the following chapter.    
  
 




Chapter 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this Chapter is to present conclusions drawn from the comparative analysis of 
co-funding groups. These conclusions are used to form recommendations for future LED 
programme design.  Finally, the chapter looks at changes implemented in the LCFI II programme 
and identifies additional areas of research.   
 
7.1. Impact of Co-funding on Project Outcomes and Sustainability 
The following is a summary of conclusions drawn from the analysis of completed projects in the 
Gijima KZN LCFI Programme. These conclusions are presented for each co-funding category, 
namely those using internal, external and government resources. They address the total LED 
impact of projects in each category as well as the relationship between these impacts and the 
specific co-funding arrangements.  
 
7.1.1. Internally Co-Funded Projects 
The internally co-funded group includes 14 enterprise development projects implemented by 
established and emerging businesses.  These projects were very successful in leveraging private 
sector financing and support as well as employment creation, poverty alleviation, and closing 
the gap between the first and second economies.  They were also highly sustainable with only 
one project failing to provide benefits beyond exhaustion of the LCFI grant. These LED 
achievements are highly commendable, especially in South Africa where “the successes of 
project-focused LED are limited” (Rogerson, 2011).  The internally co-funded projects provided 
less than ‘adequate’ results however in terms of infrastructure improvements, skills 
development, and overall impact on the local economy.  Thus, LED programmes might consider 
requiring grant beneficiaries to invest a mandatory amount in capital, training and local 
procurement.    
 




The findings of this study indicate that the success of enterprise development projects is 
positively related to internal co-funding commitments. This conclusion is supported by 
members of the Gijima KZN staff who described co-funding as a “signal that the grant 
beneficiary will take care of the money given to them” (R. Persad, 2011, pers. comm.).  
Additionally, other members of the management team claimed that internal co-funding 
“improved financial management” (M. Sibeko, 2011, pers. comm.) and “kept projects 
realistically small” (G. McDonald, 2011, pers. comm.).  These sentiments are echoed by external 
LED experts who assert that “own contribution indicates both ownership and project 
commitment” (V. Nkuna, 2011, pers. comm.) and is “absolutely imperative in this type of 
programme” (P. Zille, 2011, pers. comm.).  Finally, the LCFI Impact Assessment found that the 
benefits of co-funding for large private sector projects outweigh the additional burden placed 
on the grant recipient (SODS, 2011). Importantly however, the involvement of an experienced 
private sector partner is likely as important to project success as their co-funding commitment.    
 
7.1.2. Externally Co-Funded Projects 
The external co-funding group included three different types of projects which focused on 
supporting and training SMMEs, co-operative and entrepreneurs; enhancing tourism 
infrastructure; and developing private enterprise.  The training and infrastructure projects were 
implemented by non-profit groups while those aimed at enterprise development were 
managed by private sector interests.  Collectively these projects achieved their greatest success 
in closing the gap between the first and second economy, skills development, and local 
economic impact.  They failed however to leverage private sector support, develop economic 
infrastructure, and create sustainable employment, however for most projects these objectives 
were not part of their mandate.  Individually, the greatest success was achieved by the SMME, 
co-operative and entrepreneurial support programmes which were implemented by 
experienced non-profit groups and achieved significant pro-poor results.   
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The current study concludes that co-funding commitments are not effective at sharing risk 
among non-profit groups and in fact place an unnecessary burden on grant beneficiaries.  This 
concern is clearly iterated in the Project Preparation Trusts close-out report which states that 
“co-funding is becoming an increasingly common requirement, and poses serious constraints… 
It is difficult for non-profit organizations to raise co-funding from a different source, and 
difficult to get the timeframes of both sources synchronized in terms of implementation, 
reporting and admin requirements” (Misselhorn, 2009). Similarly, co-funding for enterprise 
development projects becomes irrelevant when provided by an external partner. This 
conclusion is supported by a representative from the DBSA who argues that “there is no impact 
on project success when co-funding comes from a third source” (V. Nkuna, 2011, pers. comm.).  
Thus, the overall impact of external co-funding on the LCFI programme is negative.  
 
7.1.3. Government Co-Funded Projects 
The government co-funded group focused exclusively on establishing rural facilities and 
enterprise.  These projects were largely unsuccessful, accomplishing only the development of 
economic infrastructure, much of which is now idle. There were however two individual 
projects that achieved moderate LED success.  These projects invested heavily in infrastructure 
development with one focusing on training and capacitating co-operatives and the other 
providing a catalyst for the local tourism industry.29 Their success is attributed to the 
experience of the implementing partner and emphasis on training in the first project, and 
dedication of the Municipal LED Manager in the second. It is also a product of their 
commitment to maintain financial feasibility and attract a private sector partner to manage the 
initiative once implemented.  
 
The current study reveals that municipal government has an important role to play in LED, 
especially through their focus on infrastructure development. Their achievements are limited 
                                                     
29 The KwaXolo Chicken Abattoir focused on training co-operatives while Sisonke Express promoted tourism 
through construction of a steam train.   
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however by a “lack of capacity and poor financial management” (M. Sibeko, 2011, pers. 
comm.); “limited LED knowledge” (R. Persad, 2011, pers. comm.); and “weak business sense” 
(P. Zille, 2011, pers. comm.).  These constraints resulted in an over reliance among LCFI projects 
on private consultants who, through a lack of financial risk, have limited commitment to project 
sustainability.  Thus, in the words of one respondent “project success is minimised when you 
have people making money out of the process rather than the outcomes” (D. Armstrong, 2011, 
pers. comm.). The conclusion therefore is that government co-funding is an insufficient risk 
sharing mechanism in the absence of a strong and financially committed private partner.  
 
7.2. Recommendations for LED Programme Design 
The following section provides recommendations for the design of future LED programmes 
based on the findings of the current study. These recommendations are presented in the 
context of agency theory which allows for the determination of an ‘optimal contract’ between 
the LED programme and the grant beneficiaries.  More specifically, these recommendations will 
address whether co-funding is an effective risk sharing mechanism in outcome based contracts.  
 
7.2.1. Agency Theory: Co-Funding as a Risk Sharing Mechanism 
The current study conceptualised Gijima KZN and the LCFI grant recipients as part of a principal-
agent relationship and thus vulnerable to the problems defined by agency theory.  The first 
agency problem is adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Eisenhardt, 1989; Mishra et 
al, 1998) which occurs if the grant applicant misrepresents their abilities and/or the viability of 
their project.  The second agency problem is moral hazard, a term used to describe problems 
such as the grant beneficiaries misspending of funds or their failure to meet the necessary time 
and resources to the project (Allen, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989).  To avoid these problems agency 
theory recommends that risk be transferred from the principal to the agent through some form 
of contract arrangement (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
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The purpose of this study is to determine whether co-funding requirements are an appropriate 
mechanism for transferring risk from Gijima KZN to the LCFI grant beneficiaries.  In theory the 
commitment of co-funding will ‘screen out’ unsuitable applicants, thus preventing adverse 
selection (Sitglitz, 1974, 1979; Grossman & Stiglitz, 1976; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976).  This co-
funding will also ‘signal’ (Spence, 1973, 1974) to Gijima KZN that the applicant will manage their 
project and finances in an efficient and effective manner, therefore precluding moral hazard.  In 
practice however the effectiveness of co-funding is dependent on its source and the level of 
individual risk it assumes.  
 
The current study concluded that co-funding is an effective risk sharing mechanism only when it 
is drawn from internal resources.  Thus, it is recommended that co-funding be required 
exclusively and consistently from all private sector grant recipients in the form of own-
commitment.  The study also revealed however that municipal LED is largely unsuccessful due 
to inefficient implementation, poor market knowledge, and weak commitment to sustainability.  
Thus, it is also recommended that LED project funding be provided to municipalities only if the 
project involves an established private partner willing to make financial commitment in the 
form of co-funding.   
 
The current research also examined non-profit LED ventures and concluded that co-funding is 
ineffective and in some cases damaging to the success of these projects.  These non-profit 
partners are typically not revenue generating and depend on additional grants, thus they are 
incapable of committing internal funds.  They do however provide important LED services in 
terms of skills development, small enterprise, co-operative and entrepreneurial support, and 
community empowerment.  Thus, it is recommended that these projects remain eligible for LED 
funding, albeit using a different contract arrangement.  The design of this contract, as well as 
contracts for private sector LED, is discussed in the following section.   
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7.2.2. Agency Theory: Optimal Contracts for LED Funding   
The agency theory framework allows for the determination of an ‘optimal contract’ to govern 
the relationship between the principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Allen & Weck, 1995).  
These contracts are predicated on either the agent’s observable behaviour or the outcome of 
their actions (Bergen et al, 1992). In the context of LED grant allocation behaviour-based 
contracts are recommended for financing non-profit projects.  As discussed in the theoretical 
framework these contracts are suitable because they do not require risk sharing and thus 
eliminate the need for co-funding (Eisenhardt, 1989; Bergen et al, 1992; Lassar & Kerr, 1996).  
They are also appropriate because the objectives of non-profit groups, namely skills, SMME, 
and entrepreneur development, align well to South Africa’s rural LED priorities (Abrahams, 
2003; Rogerson, 2005, 2011; Nel & Rogerson, 2005a).  Finally, although behaviour-based 
contracts require careful monitoring the reporting requirements may be relaxed once trust is 
established between the LED programme and the non-profit group (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
 
The promotion of LED in South Africa also focuses largely on incentivising private sector 
investment (Rogerson, 2011).  It is recommended that LED programmes govern these projects, 
as well as those implemented in partnership with local government, using outcome-based 
contracts.  These contracts require that risk is transferred from the LED programme to the grant 
recipient (Hurwicz, 1972; Eisenhardt, 1989; Bergen et al, 1992), which this study concluded is 
feasible through internal co-funding. They are also appropriate because the outcomes of 
private sector projects including enterprise development and job creation are relatively easy to 
quantify and evaluate (Eisenhardt, 1989). Finally, outcome-based contracts can be 
implemented without careful monitoring thus reducing the “onerous reporting requirements” 
(B. Reynolds, 2011, pers. comm.) lamented by many LCFI grant recipients.  Thus, the efficient 
execution of project-based LED requires that grant funding is allocated according to carefully 
designed contracts that address the objectives and risk preferences of the implementing agent.   
 
 
77 | P a g e  
 
 
7.3. Additional Areas of Research  
The current study identified several important research gaps in terms of designing effective LED 
funds. The first recognised gap is the overall lack of quantifiable impact data on LED 
programmes in South Africa which made it impossible to compare LCFI outcomes to those of 
other funds.  This research gap was also acknowledged in a study by Goldman and Nel (2006) as 
a limitation to informed policy making. It is therefore recommended that future studies 
conduct a more thorough audit of LED experience either independently or in partnership with 
South African development institutions.   
This study also confirmed the findings of earlier research that local government in South Africa 
generally lacks the skills, capacity and funding to implement LED (Nel, 2001; Pritchett & 
Woolcock, 2004; Nel et al, 2006; Mitchell, 2007; Marais, 2010).  There is also however a 
recognition in this and other studies that municipalities have an important role to play in LED 
both in terms of facilitation as well as the formation of public-private partnerships (Rogerson, 
2002a; Cunningham & Meyer-Stamer, 2005). To date limited research has been conducted 
regarding the optimal parameters of municipal involvement as well as appropriate mechanisms 
for improving their ability to foster LED.  Thus, further investigation could significantly improve 
South Africa’s LED policies as well as provide guidance for municipal LED units.  
The research on LED also lacks thorough investigation into the role of partnerships which are 
relied upon to achieve pro-poor outcomes such as capacity building and skills transfer 
(Patterson, 2008).  At present, studies have acknowledged the potential for partnerships in LED 
but have found that they are often shallow and ineffective (Mitchell, 2007) with little impact on 
reducing the risk of non-compliance (Marais, 2010). These findings were re-iterated in the 
current study and the LCFI Impact Assessment which revealed very few sustainable 
partnerships in the LCFI programme. Thus, it is recommended that research be conducted into 
best practices in terms of partnership formation and development.   
The final area of research involves further investigation into the Gijima KZN programme, 
specifically the LCFI II.  This programme was launched in 2011 and maintains many of the same 
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principals as the LCFI I including partnership requirements and support for small enterprise 
while also emphasising cluster development (DEDT, 2010).  Finally, the LCFI II addresses a key 
issue raised in this report, namely the ineffectiveness of external and government co-funding, 
by stipulating that only 70% of the project may be financed through a grant (DEDT, 2010).  
Thus, this programme and its achievements provide a valuable research opportunity to assess 
the impact of these modified co-funding requirements and evaluate some of the 
recommendations provided in this study.  
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SUMMARY OF COMPLETED PROJECTS 
 
Table 4: Summary of completed Gijima KZN LCFI projects 
Project Name Implementing Partner Primary Objective 
1) Illovo Sugar Umzimkulu Illovo Sugar 
Increase the supply of sugar cane to the Umzimkulu Mill by 
assisting independent small-growers with cane rehabilitation.      
2) Umlalazi Small Cane 
Growers 
Lima Rural Development 
Increase the supply of sugar cane to the Amatikulu Mill by 
forming small-grower cooperatives and assisting with cane 
rehabilitation.  
3) Darnall Sugar Cane 
Tongaat-Hulett Sugar 
Limited 
Increase the supply of sugar cane to the Darnall Mill by assisting 
local small-growers with cane rehabilitation. 
4) Noodsberg Cane 
Growers 
Lima Rural Development 
Rehabilitate sugar cane crops among small-growers belonging to 
the Noosdberg Cane Growers Rust.  
5) Illovo Sugar Sizele Mill Illovo Sugar Limited 
Increase the supply of sugar cane to the Sezela Mill by assisting 
independent small-growers with cane rehabilitation.      
6) Kwakhoza Cane Project  Lima Rural Development 
Increase the supply of sugar cane to the Amatikulu Mill by 
forming small-grower cooperatives and assisting with cane 
rehabilitation. 
7) Isinembe Cane Growers 
Tongaat-Hulett Sugar 
Limited 
Increase the supply of sugar cane to the Maidstone Mill by 
assisting local small-growers with cane rehabilitation. 
8) Wilderness Safaris Dive 
Camp 
Wilderness Safaris 
Construct and manage a dive camp near Sodwana Bay in a 
shared ownership arrangement with the community.  
9) BlueBrand Beef Eshowe 
Abattoir 
BlueBrand Beef 
Construct a cattle feedlot near Eshowe and increase the supply 
of cattle to their abattoir. 
10) Stables Wine Estate Stables Wine Estate 
Develop the stables winery by increasing the amount of hectares 
planted, purchasing equipment, and starting a restaurant. 
11) Crosswind Maize Mill 
Crosswind Business 
Projects 
Develop the Crosswind Maize Mill by expanding the mill, 
upgrading equipment, and purchasing raw materials.  
12) Corrida Shoes Thread of 
Hope 
Corrida Shoes  
Import a specialized sole making machine to increase input 
manufacturing. 
13) Africa Media Online 
Image Pipeline  
Africa Media Online 
Create a pipeline for the digitization of photographic media and 
train photographers in commercialization. 
14) Superior Vegetables 
Farming Tunnel Tomatoes 
Superior Vegetables 
Farming 
Construct a greenhouse in order to establish a tomato farming 
business.   
15) Eshowe Craft Support 
Agency 
UKZN Centre for 
Environment, Agriculture 
and Development 
Create an Eshowe craft support agency to increase the incomes 
of local crafters.  




Increase the supply of sugar cane to the Ushukella Mill by 
assisting independent small-growers with cane rehabilitation.      
17) Muthi Futhi Enzangahko Consultancy 
Strengthen their traditional medicine business through increased 
planting and improved community relationships. 
18) Project Preparation 
Trust Local Economic 
Action Partnership 
Project Preparation Trust 
Provide life skills training, support with business plan 
development, and advice for local entrepreneurs. 
19) Project Gateway 
Gateway Tourism 
Initiative 
Develop the local historic prison site in order to increase visitors 
to the site and area.  
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Table 4 (cont.): Summary of completed Gijima KZN LCFI projects 
Project Name Implementing Partner Primary Objective 
20) Zikulise Entrepreneur 
and SMME Support & 
Training Centre 
Zikulise Community 
Upliftment Project NPC 
Complete structural changes to the center, purchase office and 
training equipment, provide personnel support, and expand 
entrepreneurship training. 
21) Ugu Fresh Produce 
Market Packhouse 
Ugu District Municipality 
Construct a fresh produce centre to allow for cleaning and 
packaging by local small-growers. 
22) KwaXolo Chicken 
Abattoir 
Scientific Roets  
Construct a chicken abattoir to provide a market for local poultry 
farming co-operatives.  
23) Aloe and Berg Tea 
Emnabithi/Ladysmith 
Local Municipality 
Expand the current aloe and berg tea facility, source and 
cultivate raw material, develop infrastructure, and provide 
project support and facilitation. 
24) Nkandla Essential Oils Indian Ocean Trading 
Increase the number of hectares of planted herbs and improve 
yields.  
25) Sisonke Express Ingwe Municipality 
Re-establish the Sisonke stem train and rail route in order to 








LIST OF PROJECT INTERVEIWS 
 
Table 5: List of project interviews  
Project Name Person Interviewed Role in the Project 
1) Illovo Sugar Umzimkulu Guy Shange Project manager (Illovo Sugar) 
2) Umlalazi Small Cane Growers 
Peter Greene Project manager (Lima Rural Development) 
David Armstrong Private sector partner (Illovo Sugar) 
3) Darnall Sugar Cane David Armstrong Project manager (Illovo Sugar) 
4) Noodsberg Cane Growers 
Peter Greene Project manager (Lima Rural Development) 
Brian Pearce 
Representative of project beneficiaries (Manager of the 
Noodsburg cane Growers Trust) 
5) Illovo Sugar Sizele Mill 
Edgar Bruggemann Project manager (Illovo Sugar) 
Busani Gumede 
Representative of the co-funding institution (Sizanayo – Sezela 
Cane Growers Association) 
6) Kwakhoza Cane Project  Peter Greene Project manager (Lima Rural Development) 
7) Isinembe Cane Growers 
Joe Reddy Project manager (Tongaat-Hewlitt 
David Armstrong Private sector partner (Illovo Sugar) 
8) Wilderness Safaris Dive Camp 
Clive Poultney Project manager (Wilderness Safaris) 
Karen Johnson Beneficiary (Employee) 
9) Blue Brand Beef Eshowe 
Abattoir 
James Schnettler Project Manager (BlueBrand Beef) 
10) Stables Wine Estate Tiny Van Nierkerk Project Manager (Stables Wine Estate) 
11) Crosswind Maize Mill Wim Botes Project manager (Crosswind Business Projects) 
12) Corrida Shoes Thread of 
Hope 
Bryan Reynolds Project manager (Corrida Shoes) 
Mr. Mabaso  Beneficiary (Principal at Jabula Combined School) 
13) Africa Media Online Image 
Pipeline  
David Larsen Project manager 
Dwayne Bailey Non-profit partner (translate.org)  
14) Superior Vegetables Farming 
Tunnel Tomatoes 
Kingsford Ntuli Project manager 
Warren Hewlitt Private sector partner 
Telela Maqoma  Representative of the co-funding institution (Ithala Bank) 
15) Eshowe Craft Support Agency 
Duncan Hay Project manager (UKZN) 
Thadazile Magubane  Beneficiary (Financial and Operations Manager of the craft 
centre) 
16) Hlabisa Sugarcane Project George Mthethwa Project manager (Ingwe Development Cooperative) 
17) Muthi Futhi 
Gill Whitingham Banda Project manager (Enzanghako Consultancy) 
Patti Joshua Representative of the community partner (Senzokhule  
Co-operative) 
18) Project Preparation Trust 
Local Economic Action 
Partnership 
Mark Misselhorn Project manager (Project Preparation Trust) 
19) Project Gateway 
Colin Nadioo Project manager (Project Gateway) 
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Table 5 (cont.): List of project interviews  
Project Name Person Interviewed Role in the Project 
20) Zikulise Entrepreneur and 
SMME Support & Training Centre 
Julie Johnson Project manager (Zikulise Entrepreneur and SMME Support 
Agency) 
Marcia Zungu Representative of co-funding institution (ABSA Foundation) 
Annalie Fouche Representative of co-funding institution (Exxaro Sands) 
21) Ugu Fresh Produce Market 
Packhouse 
Sizumbuzo Hlongwe Project manager (Ugu Municipality) 
22) KwaXolo Chicken Abattoir 
Merida Roets Project manager (Scientific Roets) 
Raymod Van Vuuren Site Manager (independent consultant) 
Mandla Macebe 
Representative of the public sector partner (Hibiscus Coast 
Municipality) 
Bongiwe Mauundla Beneficiary (chicken producer) 
Zodumo Cele Beneficiary (chicken producer) 
23) Aloe and Berg Tea 
Neville Meyer Project manager (independent consultant) 
Madoda Khatide Representative of the public sector partner (DEDT) 
Thelumusa Mazibuko Beneficiary (employee) 
Hlukamisile Khanyile Beneficiary (employee) 
Rita Buthelezi  Beneficiary (employee) 
24) Nkandla Essential Oils Rob Cairns Project manager (Indian Ocean Trading) 
25) Sisonke Express 
Dudley Smith Project manager (Sisonke Municipality) 
Ibrahim Desani  Beneficiary (local business owner) 








LIST OF EXPERT INTERVIEWS 
 
Table 6: List of expert interviews   
 
Person Interviewed Title/Role 
1) Ranveer Persad Giima KZN Programme Manager 
2) Gerry McDonald Gijima KZN Programme Coordinating Unit (PCU) Team Leader 
3) Mandla Sibeko Gijima KZN Financial Contracting Unit (FCU) Team Leader 
4)Marcelle Abrahams Gijima KZN Finance Manager (former) 
5) Jay Anurith Gijima KZN Fund Advisor  
6) Sicengile Mthimkhulu Gijima KZN Area Manager – Umkhanyakude 
7) Thisha Mhlanga Gijima KZN Area Manager – Uthungulu 
8) Paul Zille Director of the Shared Growth Challenge Fund  
9) Deon Van Wyk ABSA Agri Business Specialist (former Gijima KZN Funding Forum member) 
10) Vika Ngcobo Nedbank Business Bank Advisor (former Gijima KZN Funding Forum member) 
11) Vusi Nkuna DBSA Development Fund (former Gijima KZN Funding Forum member) 
12) Richard Clacey Gijima KZN Programme Management Unit (LED Specialist)  
13) Name not disclosed  Independent Application Evaluator for Gijima KZN 
14) Fezile Sineke Gijima KZN ormer Area Manager (Uthungulu)  
15) Jonathan Mitchell Former KZN DEDT LED desk manager and Gijima KZN project officer  
16) Name not disclosed  Gijima KZN Assessor and Evaluator  
17) Gareth Coleman Team Leader of the Programme Management Unit (PMU) 
18) Andrew Layman CEO of PMB Chamber of Commerce (former consultant to Gijima KZN) 
